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1. Introduction 
1.1 Social anxiety and social anxiety disorder 
Social anxiety (SA) is the fear of embarrassment and humiliation in social situations 
caused by the expectation of negative evaluation from others. Hence, socially anxious 
individuals tend to feel tense and worried during social encounters and therefore show 
symptoms that have a great variety including physiological reactions like blushing, 
sweating or heart palpitations as well as behavioral manifestations like the avoidance of 
the anxiety-provoking situation. The core issues of this phenomenon are social fears 
which are very common among the general population exhibiting a lifetime prevalence 
of 15.9% in developed countries. These social fears can refer to a variety of social 
situations like speaking up in a meeting (12.5%) or in public (13.0%), but also to using 
a public bathroom (3.1%) or to writing, eating or drinking in public (4.4%; Stein et al., 
2010).  
In some people, however, social anxiety rises to a level that keeps them from interacting 
with others and leads them to withdraw from social exchange. This intense and 
impairing form of social anxiety is called social anxiety disorder (SAD; also known as 
social phobia) which represents one of the most common mental disorders (Stein and 
Stein, 2008). Diagnostic criteria are defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV; table 1; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) as 
well as in the International Classification of Diseases 10 (ICD-10; table 2; World Health 
Organization, 2016). The lifetime prevalence indicated in different studies varies with 
values of 5.0% (Grant et al., 2005), 6.1% (Stein et al., 2010) and 12.1% (Ruscio et al., 
2008) depending on which criteria have been used to diagnose SAD in the respective 
study. SAD is a phenomenon that affects individuals of any age by typically having an 
early onset in childhood or adolescence (Chavira and Stein, 2005) and persisting into 
adulthood and even late life (Cairney et al., 2007). By causing a severe loss of quality of 
life (Mendlowicz and Stein, 2000) as well as high economical costs (Lipsitz and 
Schneier, 2000) SAD is a burden for both the individual and the society. 
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Table 1. DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for social anxiety disorder (SAD) 
A A marked and persistent fear of one or more social or performance situations in 
which the person is exposed to unfamiliar people or possible scrutiny by others. 
The individual fears that he or she will act in a way (or show anxiety 
symptoms) that will be humiliating or embarrassing. 
B Exposure to the feared social situation almost invariably provokes anxiety, 
which may take the form of a situationally bound or situationally predisposed 
panic attack. 
C The person recognizes that the fear is excessive or unreasonable. 
D The feared social or performance situations are avoided or else are endured 
with intense anxiety or distress. 
E The avoidance, anxious anticipation, or distress in the feared social or 
performance situation(s) interferes significantly with the person’s normal 
routine, occupational (academic) functioning, or social activities or 
relationships, or there is marked distress about having the phobia. 
F In individuals under age 18 years, the duration is at least 6 months. 
G The fear or avoidance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a 
substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition 
and is not better accounted for by another mental disorder (e.g. Panic Disorder 
With or Without Agoraphobia, Separation Anxiety Disorder, Body Dysmorphic 
Disorder, a Pervasive Developmental Disorder, or Schizoid Personality 
Disorder). 
H If a general medical condition or another mental disorder is present, the fear in 
Criterion A is unrelated to it, e.g., the fear is not of stuttering, trembling in 
Parkinson’s disease, or exhibiting abnormal eating behavior in Anorexia 
Nervosa or Bulimia Nervosa). 
Specify the disorder as generalized if the fears include most social situations (also 
consider the additional diagnosis of Avoidant Personality Disorder). 
 
 
Table 2. ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for social anxiety disorder (SAD) 
F40.1 Social phobias: 
Fear of scrutiny by other people leading to avoidance of social situations. More 
pervasive social phobias are usually associated with low self-esteem and fear of 
criticism. They may present as a complaint of blushing, hand tremor, nausea, or 
urgency of micturition, the patient sometimes being convinced that one of these 
secondary manifestations of their anxiety is the primary problem. Symptoms may 
progress to panic attacks. 
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1.2 Theoretical models of social anxiety disorder 
Individuals with SAD tend to avoid the anxiety-provoking stimulus (i.e., the feared 
social situation). However, while it might be possible for a person with an 
arachnophobia to avoid encounters with spiders without a relevant impairment of life 
quality, socially anxious individuals cannot shirk every social situation so easily and 
thus often have to face feared stimuli. This makes a huge difference to specific phobias 
like arachnophobia, height phobia or claustrophobia since in these, the strict avoidance 
of the phobic object is thought to be a core mechanism for the persistence of the anxiety 
(Clark, 2001). So why does SAD persist over years or even decades although socially 
anxious persons are exposed to feared cues in their everyday life? 
In order to explain this question, different theoretical models have been proposed since 
SAD began to be distinguished from other phobias in the 1960s (Marks and Gelder, 
1966). Early theoretical work regarding this issue has been made by Beck, Emery and 
Greenberg (1985), Butler (1985), Hartman (1983), Heimberg and Barlow (1988), Leary 
(1983), Salkovskis (1991) and Trower and Gilbert (1989). Taking their considerations 
into account, in the 1990s, two theoretical models came up which have been shaping the 
social anxiety research for the past two decades up to now: the “Cognitive Model of 
Social Phobia” by David M. Clark and Adrian Wells (1995) and the “Cognitive-
Behavioral Model of Anxiety in Social Phobia” by Ronald M. Rapee and Richard G. 
Heimberg (1997).  
 
1.2.1 Clark and Wells: A Cognitive Model of Social Phobia 
According to the model proposed by Clark and Wells (1995), the occurrence of a social 
situation activates assumptions in individuals with SAD that they have developed of 
themselves in the past due to negative experiences in former social encounters. These 
assumptions consist of the belief that in social situations, they behave in an inept and 
unacceptable way, and that such behavior leads to detrimental consequences like social 
rejection and loss of status and worth. The consequence of this is that individuals with 
SAD perceive danger in social situations, which leads to the automatic activation of an 
“anxiety program” (p. 70) comprising cognitive, somatic, affective and behavioral 
responses. These responses help to maintain or even exacerbate anxiety by becoming 
further sources of perceived danger and thus starting a vicious circle. An important 
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element of this is that individuals with SAD tend to become preoccupied with their 
somatic reactions and negative thoughts about their social evaluation so that their ability 
to process social cues is interfered. According to Clark and Wells, “the importance of 
this processing bias is that it prevents social phobics from getting maximum benefit 
from their everyday experience with social situations or from the exposure exercises in 
behavior therapy treatment programs” (p. 72). 
 
1.2.2 Rapee and Heimberg: A Cognitive-Behavioral Model of Anxiety in Social Phobia 
Similarly to Clark and Wells’ assumptions which they argue are activated in persons 
with SAD in social encounters, Rapee and Heimberg (1997) suggest that socially 
anxious individuals form a mental representation of the self and their external behavior 
and appearance as presumably seen by the audience when entering a social situation. 
This representation is based on inputs from long-term memory including prior 
experiences in similar situations as well as the general image the person has of him-
/herself and modified by perceived both internal (e.g. proprioception, somatic 
symptoms) and external cues (e.g. audience feedback). Because socially anxious 
individuals exhibit information processing biases and an attentional resource allocation 
this representation is not likely to be objective but rather negatively distorted. 
Simultaneously, the socially anxious individual forms an opinion about what 
performance standard or norm he/she expects is utilized by the audience in the given 
situation and then compares his/her mental representation of the self with this standard. 
This leads to a discrepancy between the two compared elements, which is why the 
socially anxious individual expects a negative evaluation and thus also social 
consequences like rejection from the audience. This leads to physiological, cognitive 
and behavioral anxiety symptoms which in turn influence the mental representation the 
socially anxious person has of him-/herself and therefore, a vicious circle is formed. 
Beside all differences, the two presented models both attribute an important causal role 
of information processing biases to the maintenance process of SA since they suggest 
that biases in the interpretation of (i.e., interpretation bias) as well as the attention 
towards (i.e., attention bias) social cues confirm the negative impression the socially 
anxious person has of him-/herself as a social object and thus maintain the symptoms of 
anxiety. 
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1.3 Information processing biases in social anxiety 
According to both theoretical models, socially anxious individuals are supposed to 
exhibit specific information processing biases. Information processing biases in general 
are cognitive biases which emerge in all human beings in situations of uncertainty or 
when information processing time and ability are limited. Under such circumstances 
humans employ heuristic principles in order to make complex tasks simpler. As a 
consequence biases arise (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
In socially anxious individuals, however, further information processing biases appear 
when entering a social situation. Two of these biases are of particular importance and 
will be described in the following: 
 
1.3.1 Interpretation bias 
Socially anxious persons tend to interpret neutral or ambiguous stimuli as threatening, 
which in SA research is called negative interpretation bias. Several studies found 
evidence for the existence of this bias using different types of stimulus material (for a 
review, see Morrison and Heimberg, 2013): 
Using video sequences in which an actor or an actress commented on the spectator’s 
actions or belongings in a positive, negative or ambiguous way Amir et al. (2005) 
showed that socially anxious persons assessed the valence of ambiguous cues as more 
negative than did non-anxious controls. This negative interpretation bias in spoken cues 
is not limited to verbal expressions but was also observed for prosody in a study in 
which meaningless utterances spoken in a neutral, angry, sad, fearful, disgusted or 
happy tone of voice were used as stimulus material (Quadflieg et al., 2007). 
Other studies investigated the interpretation bias in SA by using facial expression as 
stimuli (for a review, see Machado-de-Sousa et al., 2010): Winton et al. (1995) found 
that socially anxious subjects are more likely to assess others’ emotional facial 
expressions as negative than non-anxious controls. Trying to approach the dynamic 
nature of facial expressions more accurately Joormann and Gotlib (2006) utilized a 
morphed-faced task but found no evidence for a negative interpretation bias in 
individuals with SA. In another morphed-face study, however, socially anxious 
individuals were more likely to misinterpret disgust as contempt than non-anxious ones, 
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which demonstrates a negative interpretation bias regarding the intention of the speaker 
towards the listener (Heuer et al., 2010). 
Another feature of the interpretation bias in SA is that socially anxious individuals tend 
to interpret positive social events in a negative way, e.g. as threatening (Alden et al., 
2008). This negative interpretation of positive events appears in socially anxious 
persons more often than in individuals with other anxiety disorders and correlates with 
the severity of personal fears (Laposa et al., 2010). Further, individuals with SAD also 
tend to interpret unambiguous but mildly negative social events in a more negative or 
even catastrophic fashion than patients with other anxiety disorders or non-anxious 
controls (Stopa and Clark, 2000). 
It could also be shown that socially anxious individuals exhibit a negative interpretation 
bias not only in response to external but to internal cues as well: While persons with 
SAD generally tend to have more negative self-evaluative thoughts (Stopa and Clark, 
1993), they are also more likely to interpret their own social performance as more 
negatively than non-clinical controls (Wallace and Alden, 1997) and to think that 
anxiety symptoms that they have in social situations are interpreted by others as a sign 
for intense anxiety or a psychiatric condition rather than a normal physical state (Roth et 
al., 2001). 
Finally, other studies suggest that the negative interpretation bias in social anxiety may 
be accompanied by a lack of a benign interpretation bias that can be found in non-
anxious individuals (Hirsch and Mathews, 1997; Constans et al., 1999; Hirsch and 
Mathews, 2000). 
Taken together, there is much evidence that socially anxious individuals tend to make 
more threat interpretations and fewer benign interpretations especially in response to 
ambiguous stimuli than non-anxious persons do. To affirm that this interpretation bias 
plays a causal role in the maintenance of SA as hypothesized by theoretical models, 
recent research has used cognitive bias modification (Beard, 2011) to train socially 
anxious individuals to interpret ambiguous stimuli in a more benign way. As a result, 
adults high in SA (Beard and Amir, 2008) as well as adults with generalized SAD 
(Amir and Taylor, 2012) were more likely to interpret ambiguous cues in a benign way 
after performing an interpretation modification training, which also lead to a reduction 
of symptoms of SA. These findings underline that research on the field of information 
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processing biases in SA is not only of academic interest, but has also practical benefit 
for the treatment of patients with SAD. Likewise, research on the effects of cognitive-
behavioral therapy (CBT) which in the field of SAD tries to help patients to generate 
alternative interpretations for ambiguous cues and thus correct the negative 
interpretation bias found that on a forced-choice measure the negative interpretation 
bias was greater in untreated individuals with generalized SAD in comparison to treated 
ones and non-anxious controls while, however, with an open-ended measure this 
outcome could not be replicated (Franklin et al., 2005). 
 
1.3.2 Attention bias 
As a second difference to non-anxious persons, socially anxious individuals are hyper-
vigilant towards threatening stimuli. This form of information processing bias is called 
attention bias in SA research. Research up to now has demonstrated this bias using 
different paradigms (for a review, see Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Schultz and Heimberg, 
2008): 
Early research in the 1990s began investigating the attention bias by using a 
modification of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1938; Mathews and MacLeod, 1985) in which 
participants were asked to name the color of the letters in which the presented words are 
printed (blue, green, yellow, or red). The presented words comprise social threat words, 
physical threat words and non-threat words. Presumably because of a difficulty to 
ignore social threat individuals with SAD were even slower to color-name social threat 
words than non-threat words in comparison to non-anxious controls (Mattia et al., 
1993). This effect could be shown to be specific for social anxiety by comparing 
individuals with SA with patients with other anxiety disorders like panic disorder (Hope 
et al., 1990; Maidenberg et al., 1996) and generalized anxiety disorder (Becker et al., 
2001) while a present comorbidity with depression seems to make the attention bias 
disappear (Grant and Beck, 2006). 
Another paradigm that was early used to investigate the attention bias in social anxiety 
was the probe detection task initially described by MacLeod et al. (1986) in the 1980s in 
order to explore attention biases in emotional disorders. The dot probe task is a 
computer-generated paradigm in which a neutral dot is presented directly after the 
presentation of a word pair consisting of a neutral and a threat word which can appear 
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on the upper or lower area (or right and left area) of the computer monitor with equal 
probability. Likewise, the subsequent dot appears randomly on one of the two areas and 
the response time is measured which a participant needs to decide in which area the dot 
appears. Presumably because their attention is allocated and fixed to social threat, 
patients with SAD are faster to detect probes following social threat words (Asmundson 
and Stein, 1994). This finding could be replicated by Musa et al. (2003) whose results 
are additionally in line with those of Grant and Beck (2006) who found that while 
simultaneously suffering on depression patients with SAD do not exhibit the attention 
bias. 
In order to use a more ecologically valid stimulus material, Mogg and Bradley (2002) 
modified the dot-probe task by employing pictures of facial impressions instead of 
words arguing that these may be closer to naturalistic social situations. Likewise, they 
found that anxious individuals tend to allocate their attention towards threatening 
stimuli. 
Photographs of faces were also used in a face-in-the-crowd task in which pictures of 
human faces taken from the same person but varying in the expression of different 
emotions like anger, disgust and happiness were shown in matrices. The participants’ 
task consisted in deciding whether all the faces in the matrix were similar to each other 
or if one of the faces did not fit to the others. It was found that individuals with SAD 
were faster to detect an angry face than a happy face in a neutral crowd, which can be 
explained by an attention allocating towards threatening stimuli. Furthermore, patients 
with SAD were slower to detect neutral faces in angry crowds as well as in happy 
crowds than non-anxious controls. The authors of this study suggest that these findings 
could be in line with the attention bias towards threatening cues since happy faces 
which smile could be perceived as threatening by socially anxious persons due to their 
fear of being laughed at (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999). 
Using the eye-tracking technique in which a camera records the movements of the 
participants’ eyes while watching stimulus material, there are likewise indications for an 
attention bias in SA: Socially anxious individuals were found to be faster to fixate on 
emotional faces than on neutral ones in comparison to low anxious persons, but to then 
direct their gaze also faster away from the emotional faces, which indicates that the 
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attention bias towards threat may be accompanied by a subsequent avoidance of the 
threatening stimulus (Garner et al., 2006). 
In order to explore the existence of the attention bias in SA in an environment as close 
to natural social situations as possible, Veljaca and Rapee (1998) used a live audience 
consisting of confederates who gave feedback via prescribed positive behaviors like 
nodding and smiling or negative ones like yawning and looking at their watch while 
subjects giving a speech. Subjects were instructed to record these feedbacks. As a result, 
those high in SA were more accurate than low anxious controls at detecting actual 
negative feedback of the audience. Additionally, there was an indication for a negative 
interpretation bias since high socially anxious individuals were more liberal in 
interpreting a behavior as negative, which is similar to the findings of Winton et al. 
(1995) described above. 
Recent research has tried to verify the presumed causal role of the attention bias for the 
maintenance of SA. To this end, patients with SAD were trained to allocate their 
attention away from threatening social stimuli using a computer-based attention 
modification procedure based on a probe detection task. As a result, patients with SAD 
disengaged more easily from threatening stimuli after the attention modification 
training, which can be seen as a reduction of the attention bias. This also led to a 
reduction of SA symptoms with half of the participants even no longer meeting DSM-
IV criteria for SAD (Amir et al., 2009). These results underline the causal role of 
attention bias in SA, which is also reflected by findings of the research on 
psychotherapy suggesting that CBT which is the psychological gold standard therapy 
for anxiety disorders (Hofmann and Smits, 2008) reduces the attention bias in SA 
(Tobon et al., 2011).  
However, there are also a number of studies which did not clearly demonstrate an 
attention bias in SA (Horenstein and Segui, 1997; Amir et al., 2003). Moreover, several 
studies (most of them using the probe detection paradigm and pictures of faces 
expressing positive, neutral or negative emotions as stimuli) indicated, in contrast to the 
hypervigilance-hypothesis, that socially anxious persons exhibit an attentional 
avoidance of social threat stimuli (Mansell et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2002). Because of 
the scientific debate having arisen about these contradictory findings and their 
implications on the plausibility of the different theoretical models of SA (Schultz and 
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Heimberg, 2008), subsequent studies were designed to verify or falsify hypotheses 
based on previous investigations. To this end, Sposari and Rapee (2007) utilized the 
same experimental setup (including the same stimuli and method) as Mansell et al. 
(1999) with one little modification regarding the threat induction: While Mansell et al. 
told their participants that they were expected to hold a speech and locate the audience’s 
evaluative behavior after the dot probe session, Sposari and Rapee instructed their 
subjects that they would have to give a speech afterwards, but without a hint for a 
locating of the behavior of audience members.  Interestingly, the results of Sposari and 
Rapee, contrary to Mansell et al., are indicative for the existence of an attention bias 
towards threat in SA. These contradictions show that the very nature of the attention 
bias in SA is still not fully understood and that further research on this field is 
necessary. This is also reflected by findings of two recent studies suggesting that the 
attention bias in SA may also be accompanied by a bias away from positive social 
stimuli: In the first study, it was shown that an attention bias away from positive social 
cues mediated the effect of SA on the response to a social stressor (Taylor et al., 2010). 
The second study demonstrated that an attention training towards positive cues leads to 
a diminished anxiety reactivity to a stressor (Taylor et al., 2011). 
 
1.3.3 Stimuli used to investigate information processing biases in social anxiety 
There is a large body of studies which tried to investigate information processing biases 
in SA. Most of them found evidence for the hypotheses that socially anxious persons 
tend to interpret neutral or ambiguous stimuli as threatening (i.e., interpretation bias) 
and that they are hyper-vigilant towards threatening stimuli (i.e., attention bias). In the 
course of this, the history of research on the field of information processing biases in 
SA is also a history of trying to find appropriate valid stimuli which approach natural 
social situations as close as possible in order to provoke realistic responses of subjects 
investigated. Put in other words, the validity and conclusiveness of a study is directly 
depending on the validity of the stimulus material utilized. Taken together, previous 
research has been confined on a limited number of social stimuli such as verbal (both 
written as words (Mattia et al., 1993; Asmundson and Stein, 1994) as well as spoken as 
comments (Amir et al., 2005)), prosodic (Quadflieg et al., 2007), facial (Machado-de-
Sousa et al., 2010; Staugaard, 2010) and behavioral (Veljaca and Rapee, 1998) 
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expressions. However, there are further social communication signals which occur 
frequently in everyday life, but have not yet received attention in SA research. Since 
research employing the described body of stimulus material has to some extent 
produced controversial results (see above) and thus, the very nature of information 
processing biases in SA has not yet been fully understood, the use of further social 
communication signals as stimuli would be a valuable supplement. 
 
1.4 Relevance of laughter for social anxiety 
1.4.1 Laughter as a communication signal 
One of the social communication signals that have not been utilized in SA research is 
laughter. And yet laughter can be assumed to have great potential as a tool for the 
investigation of information processing biases in SA because of its ambiguity and 
frequent occurrence in everyday life as described in Ritter et al. (2015, p. 178f): 
“Laughter is an ancient communication signal which as tickling laughter is already 
present in nonhuman primates (Davila Ross et al., 2009). In humans it evolved into 
different laughter types (e.g. joyful or taunting laughter) which serve different social 
functions such as group bonding (Provine, 2013), but also social segregation (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt, 1970). Tickling laughter, on the other hand, is an evolutionary older type of 
laughter. It is confined to bodily interactions serving the reinforcement of play behavior 
(Panksepp and Burgdorf, 2003) and contains less complex social information. 
It could be shown that these different laughter types are distinguishable based on the 
vocal signal alone (Szameitat et al., 2009). Nevertheless, the laughter signal is not 
unambiguous. It can remain difficult to distinguish between the different types 
especially when there is little or no contextual information. This very ambiguity makes 
laughter as stimulus material for SA research very attractive as it is siutable to evoke 
typical behavioral correlates of SA through the transmission of ambiguous social 
information to socially anxious individuals whose central fears pertain to humiliation, 
criticism and rejection.” 
Furthermore, laughter is a communication signal that comprises two sensory modalities: 
an auditory and a visual one. Therefore, unlike most of the stimulus material utilized in 
previous SA research, laughter stimuli can be presented in different sensory modalities 
and thus, the ambiguity of the originally audiovisual laughter signal can be further 
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increased by removal of sensory redundancy through unimodal (i.e., auditory) 
presentation. As described above, a negative interpretation bias in SA means that 
socially anxious persons tend to interpret specifically ambiguous stimuli as threatening. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that this bias is more prominent for unimodally presented 
laughter stimuli as compared to multimodal presentations. 
 
1.4.2 Laughter as an emotion-expressing as well as emotion-provoking stimulus 
Laughter is able to serve different social functions in everyday behavior because it is 
able to convey emotional states from the laughing person to the laughter-perceiving 
individuals. Put in other words, it is a means to express emotions of the laughing 
person, but simultaneously also elicits emotions in the laughter-perceiving individuals. 
Therefore, the understanding of the potency of laughter as a communication signal is 
closely related to the understanding of the nature of emotions. 
To try this, however, is a difficult task to undertake since psychological research up to 
now has produced a plethora of different definitions of emotion due to various different 
theories about what emotions are, how they emerge and what exact functions they serve 
(Darwin, 1872; James, 1884; Cannon, 1927; Schachter and Singer, 1962; Lazarus, 
1991). Nevertheless, useful frameworks could be created to classify emotions and 
emotional stimuli: While emotions can be categorized to discrete categories such as 
happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust or surprise (Ekman, 1992; Ekman et al., 1969), 
there also exist dimensional models of emotion which try to conceptualize emotions by 
defining where these are located in two or more so called dimensions (Wundt, 1896; 
Osgood et al., 1957; Fontaine et al., 2007). According to the Pleasure-Arousal-
Dominance (PAD) emotional state model by Mehrabian and Russell (1977), emotional 
states can be described by three independent and bipolar dimensions which are 
pleasure-displeasure, degree of arousal and dominance-submissiveness: The pleasure-
displeasure dimension indicates how pleasant an emotion is, e.g. joy is high on pleasure 
while sadness, anger and fear are high on displeasure. The dimension of arousal refers 
to a combination of activity and alertness and indicates how awake and energized one is 
during an emotional state, e.g. anger and rage have a high arousal state while boredom 
has a low one. Finally, the dominance-submissiveness dimension refers to how 
unrestricted or free one feels to act in a variety of ways, e.g. anger and rage are rather 
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dominant emotions while fear is a rather submissive one since while having fear all 
attention is focused to the fear-provoking stimulus greatly limiting the range of acting 
possibilities (Mehrabian, 1980). Using these three basic dimensions of emotions any 
emotional state can be adequately described: It could be shown that using State 
Pleasure, State Arousal and State Dominance scales (Mehrabian and Russell, 1974), 
different emotions can be matched to a specific configuration of the three dimensions 
(which have a range from - 1 to + 1 with a neutral value of 0; table 3; Russell and 
Mehrabian, 1977). 
For the field of laughter perception in SA, this means that emotions that are expressed 
by laughter can also be described using dimensional models of emotions. Since the aim 
of the present study is to investigate information processing biases in socially anxious 
individuals the utilized stimulus material must be able to express the emotional state of 
the laughing person (including his/her arousal, dominance and receiver-directed 
valence) so that based on the assumed emotional state of the sender, the laughter-
perceiving individuals can try to assess the social inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the 
presented laughter. To investigate what emotional state a stimulus expresses, 
measurements of emotional dimensions can be performed for each stimulus and then 
compared to measurements of emotional states in previous studies. It can be assumed 
that different laughter types express different emotions with joyful laughter expressing a 
pleasant emotional state while taunting laughter can be presumed to express a rather 
dominant emotional state. 
 25 
Table 3. Definition of terms denoting emotions in term of pleasure, arousal and 
dominance 
  Pleasure  Arousal  Dominance  
Term N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
        
Joyful 29 0.76 0.22 0.48 0.26 0.35 0.31 
Happy 29 0.81 0.21 0.51 0.26 0.46 0.38 
Anxious 28 0.01 0.45 0.59 0.31 –0.15 0.32 
Fearful 29 –0.64 0.20 0.60 0.32 –0.43 0.30 
Surprised 29 0.40 0.30 0.67 0.27 –0.13 0.38 
 
Examples of the dimensional configuration of emotional terms rated by undergraduate 
students in a study by Russell and Mehrabian (1977). Mean is the mean rating 
transformed to a – 1 to +1 scale. 
 
1.4.3 Multimodal integration of emotional stimuli 
As already outlined in the two previous chapters, laughter as a stimulus for SA research 
demonstrates various characteristics such as the capability to express emotional states 
and intentions of the laughing person, the capability to evoke emotional states in the 
laughter-perceiving individuals, as well as the advantage in comparison to other kinds 
of stimuli that it is multimodal and can be presented both unimodally as well as 
bimodally in order to vary its ambiguity. To better understand to what degree the 
ambiguity of laughter stimuli can be varied through uni- versus bimodal presentation, 
the question arises whether there is a facilitation effect during audio-visual integration 
of laughter as it could be shown for other emotion expressing cues (see below). The 
term multimodal integration refers to the process by which information from different 
sensory modalities (auditory, visual, haptic, olfactory, gustatory ones) are combined by 
the brain to influence perception of stimuli occurring in more than one sensory modality 
like most of the cues occurring in everyday communication do. The advantage of a 
multimodal integration is, on the one hand, that when information of different 
modalities are redundant the reliability of sensory estimates can be increased. On the 
other hand, when information of different modalities are non-redundant, complementary 
cues from different modalities can be put together to gain an information that could not 
be extracted from one modality alone (Ernst and Bulthoff, 2004). Since laughter is a 
communication signal that comprises two sensory modalities (i.e., vision and audition), 
an audio-visual integration of laughter in the human brain appears to be probable. Up to 
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now, however, research has not yet demonstrated an integration effect for laughter as it 
could be done for other emotional expressions (Campanella and Belin, 2007; Ethofer et 
al., 2006b): It could be found that behavioral reactions to emotional information 
carrying stimuli is facilitated by congruence between facial expression and affective 
prosody (Massaro and Egan, 1996; Dolan et al., 2001; de Gelder and Vroomen, 2000; 
Kreifelts et al., 2007). Research also showed that information obtained in one sensory 
modality can affect information processing in another (Ethofer et al., 2006a; de Gelder 
and Vroomen, 2000; Massaro and Egan, 1996). This crossmodal bias was shown to 
occur irrespective of attention why it stands to reason that multimodal integration of 
emotional information is an automatic process (de Gelder and Vroomen, 2000; Ethofer 
et al., 2006a; Collignon et al., 2008). Additionally, Collignon et al. (2008) found that 
when information from the different sensory modalities are incongruent, individuals 
tend to be led by the visual modality while categorizing emotional expression. This 
visual domination, however, did not seem to occur in a rigid manner since when the 
information of the visual modality was less reliable individuals assessed the stimulus 
material based on the auditory modality. 
In order to be able to estimate whether the ambiguity of laughter stimuli is variable by 
presenting them in different modalities, it seems reasonable to investigate the audio-
visual integration of laughter prior to utilize laughter stimuli in SA research. 
 
1.4.4 Gelotophobia: The fear of being laughed at 
While physiologically laughter in its different types serves as an everyday social 
communication signal whose benefits are appreciated by a majority of people, some 
individuals feel very uneasy when encountering a situation in which people laugh. The 
reason for their uneasiness is the fear of being ridiculed and laughed at. In order to 
describe this phenomenon, the novel concept of gelotophobia has been proposed by 
recent research (Titze, 2009) and will be described in the following:  
Gelotophobia (derived from Ancient Greek γέλως (laughter) and φοβία (fear)) is 
defined as “the pathological fear of being the object of laughter” (p. 27), and, according 
to the model of Titze, it develops on the base of “repeated traumatic experiences of 
being ridiculed (…) during childhood and adolescence” (p. 32). Its development in 
childhood is further fostered by overprotecting parents who have rigid normative 
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demands and do not smile as a positive social signal, but utilize laughter rather as a 
means to ridicule their children when these do not meet requirements. Because of that 
children do not get used to laughter as a positive element of shared identity, but identify 
laughter as something dangerous. As a result, children have difficulties in finding and 
fitting into extra-familial social groups since in these, laughter is used as a 
communication signal to define and sharpen the group’s identity. On the contrary, these 
children feel uneasy in social situations in which laughter emerges and thus behave in a 
tense and unrelaxed way so that their appearance becomes “wooden” through muscular 
tension and stiffness, which Titze (1996) calls the Pinocchio Complex. What follows is 
that gelotophobic persons appear involuntarily funny to others so that these laugh and 
thus, a vicious circle is built. 
Since this concept has a lot in common with models of SA, the question arises whether 
gelotophobia and SA are different aspects of the same entity and one a part of the other 
respectively or if these two phenomena are two different entities. Despite all similarities 
between the two concepts, previous literature regarding this question is prone to assume 
the latter possibility: Titze (2009) considers gelotophobia to be a specific variant of 
shame-bound anxiety which is why the concept of gelotophobia focuses on the self as 
the central object of evaluation (according to this, the gelotophobic person considers 
his/her self as being intolerably ridiculous), whereas the focus of SA lies on specific 
inexcusable failures in social performances but not directly on the self. Edwards et al. 
(2010) examined undergraduate students to investigate relations between gelotophobia, 
social anxiety and memories of being the target of teasing during childhood and 
adolescence. They found that gelotophobia was highly correlated to measures of SA, 
but that the association between gelotophobia and a history of being teased remained 
significant after controlling for SA. Because of these findings they conclude that 
gelotophobia is related, but distinct from SA, although their study is limited by the fact 
that they used only a sub-clinical sample. 
In contrast to previous research in SA, laughter stimuli were already utilized in the field 
of gelotophobia research: Ruch et al. (2009) recorded laughter of various emotional 
qualities on tapes and presented these to gelotophobic and non-gelotophobic 
individuals. As a result, positively motivated laughter was interpreted as more 
unpleasant by gelotophobic than by non-gelotophobic participants. Moreover, the 
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gelotophobic subjects tended more to estimate the laughing person to be in a state of 
negative affect as compared to non-gelotophobic ones. This finding could be seen as a 
counterpart to the negative interpretation bias as identified for SA (see above). 
Nevertheless, as there is no comparable study with socially anxious individuals, it still 
remains unclear whether persons with SA would response to laughter stimuli in a 
similar way as gelotophobic individuals, as Sarid et al. (2011, p. 14) state: “However, it 
seems as if the literature on social phobia does not concur with predicting these 
outcomes. Social phobics, or patients with other social anxiety disorders, should not 
necessarily feel unease when hearing others laugh or relate this laughter to them.” 
For that, it seems obvious that further research is needed to answer the question how 
socially anxious individuals perceive laughter, whether they exhibit the same 
information processing biases for laughter as they do for other social stimuli, and what 
implications the perception of laughter in socially anxious individuals has for the 
relationship between SA and gelotophobia. 
 
1.5 Emotion regulation in social anxiety 
As described in chapter 1.2, theoretical models of SAD posit that a main reason for the 
maintenance of SAD consists of the belief in individuals with SAD that they behave in 
an inadequate way in social situations and that such behavior leads to disastrous 
negative social consequences (Clark and Wells, 1995; Rapee and Heimberg, 1997). As 
extensively described, these beliefs are facilitated by information processing biases. 
However, there seem to be further mechanisms playing a role in contributing to this 
process since, despite all cognitive biases, there are further opportunities to alter 
negative assumptions and beliefs one develops about one’s own behavior and 
subsequent reactions by others. These opportunities comprise emotion regulation 
strategies such as approaching or avoiding certain emotion-provoking places, persons or 
objects (i.e., situation selection), modifying emotion-provoking situations (i.e., situation 
modification), distraction or concentrating oneself in emotion-provoking situations (i.e., 
attentional deployment), reinterpreting the meaning of the emotion-provoking stimulus 
(i.e., cognitive change), and influencing the physiological, experiential or behavioral 
responding to the emotion-provoking stimulus (i.e., response modulation; Gross, 1998). 
Thus, difficulties in emotion regulation which can be defined as “the process by which 
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individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they 
experience and express these emotions” (p. 275) may be another core feature of SA, as 
presumed by cognitive models (Hermann et al., 2004; Hofmann, 2004). 
Previous research suggests that anxiety disorders are associated with deficits in emotion 
regulation (Amstadter, 2008). Likewise, it could be shown that socially anxious 
individuals have difficulties with emotion regulation: In one study, individuals with 
SAD reported to pay less attention to their emotions and have more trouble describing 
emotions than persons with GAD and non-anxious controls (Turk et al., 2005). 
Similarly, in another study, a SAD diagnosis was best predicted by poor emotional 
understanding (Mennin et al., 2009). Furthermore, socially anxious individuals seem to 
use more emotional suppression than non-anxious ones and have greater ambivalence 
about expressing emotions and more difficulties in emotional responding. They also 
appear to fear emotional experiences more than non-anxious controls and have more 
negative beliefs about emotional expressions. The beliefs of socially anxious 
individuals that they have to control their emotional expressions in order to not appear 
weak to others have been shown to mediate the association between SA and emotional 
suppression (Spokas et al., 2009). These findings are of peculiar importance since they 
indicate a lower emotional competence in patients with SAD: Emotional competence 
which can be defined as the functional skill to “emerge from an emotion-eliciting 
encounter with a sense of having accomplished what we set out to do” (Saarni, 1999, p. 
3) has the premise to be able to identify one’s own emotions in order to be able to 
manage these. Thus, the problems patients with SAD have in implementing emotion 
regulation strategies may already start in their deficits in awareness of their emotional 
states (Werner et al., 2011). 
However, one specific emotion regulation strategy seems to be of further importance for 
the explanation of SA: Since a core problem of socially anxious individuals consists 
especially of their cognitive beliefs about their social performance and the subsequent 
consequences, they especially seem to have problems in implementing cognitive 
reappraisal strategies which can be used to modulate negative self-impressions and 
perceived danger in social situations (e.g. by imaging that the anxiety-provoking cue is 
not directed at oneself). It could be shown that non-socially anxious individuals use 
cognitive reappraisal strategies to decrease negative emotional experience (Lazarus and 
 30 
Alfert, 1964). In contrast, there are previous findings suggesting that socially anxious 
individuals have difficulties in implementing such strategies: In a study in which 
patients with SAD and non-anxious controls were trained to implement cognitive 
reappraisal strategies in response to negative self-beliefs (NSB), the SAD group had 
greater negative emotions when responding both with and without applying cognitive 
reappraisal. On the behavioral level, the SAD group was equally able to use cognitive 
reappraisal to decrease negative emotions as compared to the healthy controls. Within 
the SAD group, however, a lesser downregulation of negative emotions was associated 
with the severity of SA symptoms as measured by the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
(LSAS). This effect was not found within the control group. Additionally, on the neural 
level, it was found that individuals with SAD show later and fewer brain responses 
related to cognitive reappraisal as compared to non-anxious controls indicating that 
patients with SAD have specific deviances regarding neural timing, connectivity and 
brain-behavioral associations (Goldin et al., 2009b). Likewise, another study showed as 
well that individuals with SAD have greater negative emotions than healthy controls in 
response to both social and physical threat stimuli, but that there is no significant 
difference between these two groups regarding the ability to decrease negative emotions 
using cognitive reappraisal. On the neural level, however, it could be shown again that 
patients with SAD exhibit a reduced cognitive regulation-related neural activation 
specifically for social threat cues (Goldin et al., 2009a). Two recent studies suggest that 
the problem of patients with SAD may not primarily be the inability to implement 
cognitive reappraisal strategies but rather the lower self-efficacy they have when using 
these strategies: Werner et al. (2011) found that individuals with SAD use cognitive 
reappraisal with the same frequency as non-anxious controls, but have lower self-
efficacy in doing so, which could be indicative of a distorted perception of the emotion 
regulation efficacy in SAD patients. Moreover, it could be shown that cognitive 
reappraisal self-efficacy mediates the effects of individual CBT for SAD (Goldin et al., 
2012). 
Taken together, socially anxious individuals seem to have difficulties with emotion 
regulation and especially with cognitive reappraisal. As described, however, the exact 
mechanisms of these difficulties are not yet fully understood. Therefore, further 
research is necessary. Since the aim of the current study is to investigate laughter 
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perception in individuals with SA in order to get further insights in the processes of how 
SA influences the perception in social situations, it seems worthy to implement a 
paradigm in the current study which also allows conclusions of whether socially 
anxious individuals are able to use cognitive reappraisal strategies while perceiving 
laughter. 
 
1.6 Goals and hypotheses of the present study 
The goal of the present study was to investigate social information processing biases in 
SA and the effects of cognitive reappraisal on biased perception. To this end, novel, 
ecologically valid multimodal laughter stimuli were used because of the presumed 
advantages of this stimulus type explained above. Since this stimulus type was novel 
and not yet used in other studies, the study had to be divided into two parts:  
 
1.6.1 Pre-studies 
First, adequate stimulus sequences had to be produced and then validated using a 
sample of low-anxious individuals (i.e., pre-studies). To this end, the produced laughter 
sequences were presented to non-anxious individuals which were asked to assess 
whether the presented laughter could be categorized as joyful laughter, tickling laughter 
or taunting laughter (i.e., laughter type), and to evaluate the emotional state of the 
sender of the presented laughter (and not his/her own emotional state): The participants 
rated how pleasant the sender was towards the receiver (i.e., valence), how aroused he 
was (i.e., arousal), and how dominant he was (i.e., dominance). Moreover, the laughter 
stimuli were assessed relating to how authentic they appear (i.e., authenticity). Based on 
the literature referenced above, the following hypotheses were proposed which served 
as a plausibility check that the produced stimulus material is valid: 
1. The three laughter types joyful laughter, tickling laughter and taunting laughter 
will be recognizable based on the auditory, visual and audiovisual signal. There 
will be an audiovisual integration effect displayed by a higher recognition 
performance in the audiovisual than in the unimodal modalities. 
2. Joyful laughter will be assessed as expressing a more pleasant intention towards 
the receiver than taunting laughter. 
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3. Tickling laughter will be assessed as expressing a higher arousal than joyful 
laughter and taunting laughter. 
4. Taunting laughter will be assessed as expressing greater dominance than joyful 
laughter. 
5. The majority of laughter stimuli will be assessed as being authentic. 
 
1.6.2 Main study 
Second, these validated stimuli were presented to individuals with varying degrees of 
SA which were asked to judge the communicative intentions (social inclusion, 
exclusion) expressed in different laughter types (joyful, taunting, tickling laughter) 
while imaging themselves in one of two situations (i.e., main study): (1) being the 
intended target of the laughter, or (2) watching an actor rehearse laughter for a play (i.e., 
a condition which equals a cognitive reappraisal strategy). 
Based on the literature referenced above, the study was designed to test the following 
hypotheses: 
1. Laughter will be rated as more socially rejecting with increasing severity of SA 
(i.e., negative interpretation bias). 
2. This negative interpretation bias will decrease under cognitive reappraisal 
conditions. 
3. The negative interpretation bias will be stronger for unimodal auditory laughter 
stimuli due to the higher level of ambiguity. 
4. There will be a linear relationship between SA and faster response times to 
taunting laughter than to joyful laughter (i.e., attention bias towards threatening 
cues). 
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2. Method 
The present study consists of two parts with different goals. The first part itself is 
divided into four sections which will be called pre-studies in the following. They were 
designed to evaluate the produced laughter stimuli in order to utilize these for the 
second part of the study called main study in the following. This main study then serves 
the actual investigation about laughter perception in social anxiety. 
 
2.1 Pre-studies 
The major aim of the pre-studies was to select and validate adequate laughter stimuli for 
the main study. However, prior to evaluation of which stimuli were adept for 
investigating laughter perception in social anxiety, first a stimulus corpus had to be 
produced out of which adequate stimuli could be chosen for the main study. To this end, 
professional actors were invited to produce a video footage out of which short video 
sequences were cut. In order to select appropriate sequences for the main study, four 
groups of fourteen healthy students each were invited who were asked to assess whether 
the presented laughter could be categorized as joyful laughter, tickling laughter or 
taunting laughter (i.e., laughter type), how pleasant the sender was towards the receiver 
(i.e., valence), how aroused he was (i.e., arousal), how dominant he was (i.e., 
dominance), and how authentic the presented laughter appeared (i.e., authenticity). 
Based on the analysis of this rating, sixty sequences were selected to serve as stimuli in 
the main study. 
 
2.1.1 Participants 
In the pre-studies, in total fifty-six participants (28 women, 28 men; Mage = 24.3 years, 
SD = 2.9) voluntarily took part. They were recruited through an email to all students of 
the University of Tübingen as well as through announcements on bulletin boards in 
public buildings in Tübingen inviting subjects who have no problems in social 
situations for a study about the perception of laughter. All participants were German 
native speakers and reported normal hearing and normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
They all had no history of neurological or psychiatric illness, or substance abuse. They 
were screened for SAD using the Mini-SPIN, a 3-item short version of the 17-item 
Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2001) as well as the Liebowitz Social 
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Anxiety Scale (LSAS, German self-report version; Stangier and Heidenreich, 2003). 
Only subjects with a Mini-SPIN score below 6 and an LSAS score below 40 were 
included in the study. Prior to their inclusion in the study, written informed consent was 
given by all subjects. The participants received a monetary compensation for their 
participation. 
The fifty-six participants were divided into four groups of fourteen subjects each with 
respect to a balanced gender ratio within the groups and a comparable age distribution 
between the groups. Each of these groups was assigned for one of the pre-studies so that 
the single pre-studies had the following population parameters: 
• Pre-study valence (VAL): 7 women, 7 men; Mage = 24.6 years, SD = 3.3, 
• Pre-study arousal (ARO): 7 women, 7 men, Mage = 23.4 years, SD = 2.3, 
• Pre-study laughter type (TYP): 7 women, 7 men, Mage = 24.6 years, SD = 2.4, 
and 
• Pre-study dominance/authenticity (DOM/AUT): 7 women, 7 men, Mage = 24.3 
years, SD = 3.5. 
 
2.1.2 Stimuli 
The stimuli were part of a larger corpus of video footage produced by eight professional 
actors (4 women, 4 men) using a script-based auto-induction technique. Based on the 
video footage, 187 separate video sequences were derived showing the actors’ faces 
wearing black head caps in front of a black background in order to minimize the 
influence of different haircuts. The sequences were post-processed using Adobe 
Premiere Pro CS3 software (Adobe Systems Inc., San Jose, CA, USA) to ensure equal 
quality of the recordings. Post-production steps included an editing of videos with 
respect to the alignment of the vertical facial symmetry axis and the size of the 
portrayed faces as well as normalization of sound intensity to a mean of 70 dB (using 
PRAAT, version 5.1.07; Boersma, 2001). 
 
2.1.3 Experimental design and task 
The stimuli were shown on a computer using the software “Presentation” 
(Neurobehavorial Systems Inc., Albany, CA, USA), a 17-inch flat screen (LG Flatron 
L1953PM) and a Sennheiser HD 515 headphone (Sennheiser electronic GmbH & Co. 
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KG, Wedemark-Wanneborstel, Germany). Every stimulus was presented in three 
different modalities: auditory (A), visual (V) and audiovisual (AV). The order in which 
stimuli were presented was randomized. 
Depending on the assignment to one of the four pre-studies, participants were instructed 
to assess one of the following aspects of each of the 561 stimuli (187 auditory, 187 
visual, 187 audiovisual) by answering one of the following questions: 
• VAL: whether the presented stimulus expresses a rather pleasant/positive or 
unpleasant/negative emotional state, or put in other words, whether the sender of 
the presented stimulus is rather pleasant or unpleasant towards the receiver (i.e., 
valence); 
• ARO: whether the presented stimulus expresses a rather strong or weak 
emotional activation (i.e., arousal); 
• TYP: whether the presented stimulus expresses a joyful, tickling or taunting 
laughter (i.e., laughter type). 
• DOM/AUT: This pre-study comprised two tasks: first to asses, whether the 
presented stimulus expresses rather a dominant or submissive attitude of the 
laughing person (i.e., dominance); second, whether the presented laughter is 
rather authentic or unauthentic (i.e., authenticity).  
 
For the rating of valence, arousal, dominance and authenticity, a 9-point Self-
Assessment Manikin scale (SAM; Bradley and Lang, 1994) was used to evaluate the 
different dimensions: 
• Valence: 1 = highly unpleasant/negative; 5 = neutral; 9 = highly 
pleasant/positive; 
• Arousal: 1 = no activation; 5 = neutral; 9 = very strong activation; 
• Dominance: 1 = highly submissive; 5 = neutral; 9 = highly dominant; 
• Authenticity: 1 = highly unauthentic; 5 = neutral; 9 = highly authentic. 
 
The type of laughter was assessed using a 3-point scale: 1 = taunting laughter (In 
German the term “Auslachen” was used which means excluding (hostile) laughter); 2 = 
tickling laughter (German translation: “Kitzellachen”); 3 = joyful laughter (In German 
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the term ”Anlachen” was used which means including (welcoming/inviting/friendly) 
laughter). 
For half of the participants the scales were flipped horizontally by alternating the poles 
of the scales while keeping the neutral response option in the middle position. The aim 
of this was to avoid effects attributable to the arrangement of the response categories. 
Participants were asked to rate as fast as possible via the number keys (1-9 and 1-3 
respectively) on the keyboard. 
 
2.2 Main study 
After evaluating the produced laughter stimuli in the pre-studies and selecting 
appropriate ones based on the pre-studies’ results, the main study was carried out to 
investigate social information processing biases in SA and the effects of cognitive 
reappraisal on biased perception. To this end, sixty participants of varying degrees of 
SA were invited to assess the social inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the presented 
laughter stimuli. The description of the participant recruitment, stimuli, experimental 
set-up and performance is partly adopted from Ritter et al. (2015) where this part of the 
study and its results have been published before. Respective passages are put in 
quotation marks and italics. 
 
2.2.1 Participants 
Sixty individuals (30 women, 30 men; Mage = 24.2 years, SD = 3.2) took part in the 
main study. The recruitment of participants was similar to that one of the pre-studies, 
this time mainly via the email distribution list of the University of Tübingen, but again 
also through other forms of public announcements. The announcements invited persons 
who perceived themselves as either very shy or outgoing. Inclusion criteria were again 
German as native language and normal hearing and normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision.  Exclusion criteria were a history of neurological or psychiatric illness, or 
substance abuse or any medication at the time of data acquisition. To assure this, all 
participants were examined using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV 
(Wittchen et al., 1997), prior to their inclusion in the study. In this examination, it was 
revealed that fourteen participants met the clinical criteria of social anxiety disorder (4 
women, 10 men). Table 4 shows the sociodemographic and psychometric characteristics 
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of the study sample. All participants gave written informed consent before their 
inclusion in the study and received a monetary compensation for their participation.  
Table 4. Socio-demographic and psychometric data of the main study (adopted 
from Ritter et al. (2015, p. 179)) 
  mean (SD) 
age (years) 24.2 (3.2) 
MWT-B 31.2 (2.8) 
BDI-II 4.0 (4.1) 
LSAS 29.6 (25.9) 
STAI state (X1) 34.6 (8.3) 
STAI trait (X2) 44.7 (2.9) 
Gelotophobia 1.9 (0.7) 
 
MWT-B = “Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenz-Test”, a short test of premorbid 
intelligence; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory; LSAS = Liebowitz Social Anxiety 
Scale; STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; Gelotophobia as measured by the 
PhoPhiKat-45. 
 
2.2.2 Stimuli 
The stimulus material of the main study consisted of sixty short video sequences of 
laughing faces with duration of 1.5s each. In these video sequences three different types 
of laughter (joyful/friendly [JOY], tickling [TIC] and taunting/unfriendly [TAU] 
laughter) were portrayed. 
The video sequences were selected from the greater stimuli corpus based on the results 
of the pre-studies. Only those stimuli with a recognition rate above chance level and 
with an at least average level authenticity rating (i.e., ≥ 3,5 on the 9-point SAM) were 
selected. The final stimulus set comprised sixty video laughter sequences and was 
balanced for laughter type (JOY = 18, TIC = 20, TAU = 22), recognition rates of the 
three laughter types (unbiased hit rates ± SEM (Wagner, 1993): JOY = 0.45 ± 0.03, TIC 
= 0.52 ± 0.03, TAU = 0.47 ± 0.04; analysis of variance (ANOVA): F(1.7, 22.6) = 1.9, p 
= 0.182), and the genders of the actors (f = 27, m = 33). 
 
2.2.3 Experimental design and task 
The main experiment was conducted with the same software (“Presentation”) and 
hardware components (LG Flatron L1953PM 17-inch flat screen; Sennheiser HD 515 
headphone) as utilized in the pre-studies. “The participants were seated in a 
comfortable position approximately 70 cm from the screen wearing headphones. The 
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volume of sound presentation was adjusted to a comfortable volume for each 
participant. The screen had a resolution of 800 × 600 pixels and presented visual 
stimulus components were approximately the same size as a real face. 
The main experiment was divided into two sessions with a short break in between. To 
modulate the ambiguity of the laughter signal, participants were presented with either 
audiovisual (AV) or audio (A) recordings of laughter. During each session all stimuli 
were presented under two different sensory conditions: unimodal auditory (A) and 
bimodal audiovisual (AV).” (Ritter et al., 2015, p. 179) The stimulus sequence was 
randomized. The two sessions differed with respect to the instructed interactional focus: 
“In one session, the participants were asked to imagine they were directly addressed by 
the presented laughter (SELF). During the other session they were instructed to 
imagine they were watching an actor practicing a specific type of laughter (i.e., an 
imaginary technique which can be used as cognitive reappraisal for emotion regulation, 
OTHER). The order of these two conditions was balanced across the participants, and 
the stimulus order within sessions was fully randomized. After each stimulus a 
horizontal 4-point scale with the symbols “>> > < <<” and the words “Anlachen” 
(German for friendly/socially inclusive laughter) and “Auslachen” (German for 
unfriendly/ socially exclusive laughter) at opposite ends of the scale was presented (see 
Fig. 1). The participants were instructed to respond with “>>” if they decided that the 
laughter clearly belonged to the category at the open sides of the symbols. “>” 
indicated a decision where the participants were not absolutely sure but judged the 
laughter sequence as more likely belonging to the respective category. Responses were 
required within a time frame of 5 s following stimulus onset, and the participants were 
instructed to respond as quickly as possible to the stimuli. Responses were given with 
the right hand by pressing one of four buttons on a Cedrus RB-730 Response Pad 
(Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, CA, USA). The response scale was flipped 
horizontally for half of the participants to avoid effects attributable to the arrangement 
of response alternatives. A scale with an even number of response options was chosen 
to prevent a central response tendency.” (Ritter et al., 2015, p. 179f) 
After each response, a short visual feedback on the answer recorded by the computer 
was presented. 
The volume was individually adjusted to a comfortable level and a short training 
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session based on stimuli not included in the main experiment was run in order to 
familiarize the participants with the experimental setting. Before starting the main 
experiment, the experimenter made sure that participants fully understood the procedure 
and their task and that they were familiar with the use of the response device. 
Laughter ratings and response times were recorded as outcome parameters. 
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Figure 1. Trial design 
Two exemplary experimental trials. (a) illustrates a trial with audiovisual (AV) laughter 
presentation while (b) shows an auditory (A) trial, respectively. The participants' task was to 
evaluate on a four-point scale if and how clearly the laughter expressed a friendly (German: 
“Anlachen”) or an unfriendly (German: “Auslachen”) social intention. Time specifications on the 
time axis indicate the durations of stimulus presentation, additional response window and inter-
trial-interval. This figure is adopted from Ritter et al. (2015, p. 180). 
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2.2.4 Additional measures 
2.2.4.1 Social anxiety 
The severity of social anxiety was assessed using the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
(LSAS, German self-report version; Stangier and Heidenreich, 2003). This instrument 
comprises 24 items portraying 11 social interactional and 13 public performance 
situations which people with a high level of social anxiety potentially fear and/or avoid. 
Each item has to be rated on a 4-point-Likert-scale concerning both fear and avoidance. 
The LSAS has a high reliability and a high convergent validity with other measures of 
social anxiety (Heimberg et al., 1999; Fresco et al., 2001). In the present study, the self-
report version of this scale was used. 
 
2.2.4.2 General anxiety 
State and trait anxiety was measured using the State-Trait-Anxiety-Inventory (STAI, 
German version; Laux et al., 1981). It consists of two questionnaires with 20 items 
each. The items contain statements which are rated on a 4-point-Likert-scale with 
respect to the degree to which the participant agrees with the statement. STAI-X1 
captures state anxiety while STAI-X2 captures trait anxiety (STAI-X2). 
 
2.2.4.3 Gelotophobia 
The German version of the PhoPhiKat-45 was used to assess individual levels of 
gelotophobia, i.e., the fear of being laughed at. The factors gelotophilia and 
katagelasticism were also recorded as part of the PhoPhiKat-45 but not included in the 
analysis. This 45-items instrument employs a 4-point-Likert-scale and is based on the 
works of Ruch and Proyer (2009) who developed the PhoPhiKat-45 as an instrument to 
measure the perception and use of laughter as captured in the three above mentioned 
factors. 
 
2.2.4.4 Verbal intelligence 
As a control of premorbid intelligence, the Mehrfach-Wortschatz-Intelligenz-Test 
(MWT-B; Lehrl, 1977) was applied to measure verbal intelligence. The MWT-B 
comprises 37 items and possesses a high reliability and validity exhibiting a correlation 
of r = 0.72 with measures of global intelligence (Lehrl et al., 1995). 
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2.2.4.5 Depression 
Since depression has a great influence on the perception of social cues, the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI-II, German version; Hautzinger et al., 2009) was utilized as 
a self-report measure to control for depressive symptoms in participants additional to 
the clinical interview conducted by a psychiatrist. The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report 
questionnaire measuring the severity of affective, motivational, cognitive and somatic 
symptoms of depression. It has a high reliability and validity and is able to differentiate 
between different grades of depression (Beck et al., 1988; Kuhner et al., 2007). 
 
These psychometric measures were included either as covariate of interest (LSAS) or 
control variables (STAI X1 and X2, PhoPhiKat- 45, MWT-B, BDI-II).  
 
2.3 Data analysis 
The data of the pre-studies as well as of the main study were statistically analyzed using 
IBM SPSS Statistics Version 19 (IBM Corporation, Armonk, NY, USA). 
 
2.3.1 Pre-studies 
The laughter type recognition performance was evaluated using unbiased hit rates (Hu). 
To this end, the raw hit rates of each participant were calculated for each laughter type 
(joyful laughter, tickling laughter, taunting laughter) and each modality (auditory, 
visual, audiovisual). Then, the unbiased hit rates were calculated by multiplying the raw 
hit rate by the positive predictive value resulting in unbiased hit rates for each laughter 
type (joyful laughter, tickling laughter, taunting laughter) and each modality (auditory, 
visual, audiovisual). The reason for using unbiased hit rates was that they are a more 
precise measure of classification performance than the raw hit rate since they account 
for false alarms and biases in the use of response categories (Wagner, 1993).  Prior to 
further analysis, the unbiased hit rates were arcsine transformed. Simultaneously, 
posterior probabilities were calculated for each laughter type (joyful laughter, tickling 
laughter, taunting laughter) and each modality (auditory, visual, audiovisual) indicating 
chance level. Then, unbiased hit rates and posterior probability for each laughter type 
and modality were compared using t-tests in order to investigate whether stimuli were 
recognizable in each laughter type and modality. In order to test the hypothesis about 
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the audio-visual integration, a 3 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA with modality (A, V, 
AV) and laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) as within-subject factors was conducted. The 
results were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected, in order to account for potential violations 
of sphericity (Geisser and Greenhouse, 1958). Main effects of the within-subject factors 
and their interactions were further examined using post-hoc t-tests on the outcome 
parameters. 
In order to test the hypotheses about the emotional dimensions of laughter, mean ratings 
of valence, arousal, dominance and authenticity were calculated for each stimulus. 
Then, a one-way ANOVA with laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) as factor was conducted 
for each of the three dimensional ratings (valence, arousal, dominance). To account for 
heteroscedasticity detected by a Levene’s test (Levene, 1960), the results were corrected 
using the Welch’s t-test (Welch, 1947). Main effects were further examined using post-
hoc t-tests on the outcome parameters. 
Since the authenticity rating served only to exclude stimuli which were perceived as 
being unauthentic from the stimulus material for the main study, the analysis of the 
authenticity rating remained descriptive: The mean and standard deviation were 
calculated and it was assessed how many stimuli were above a defined level of 3.5 
above which the authenticity was assumed to be high enough for the stimuli to serve as 
realistic cues. 
 
2.3.2 Main study 
“The laughter rating values were transformed from symbols to numerical values (1 = 
clearly unfriendly laughter [German: “Auslachen”]; 2 = rather unfriendly laughter; 3 
= rather friendly laughter [German:”Anlachen”]; 4 = clearly friendly laughter).  
In order to avoid biases in the response time data due to outliers based on inattention 
all responses above two standard deviations from the individual mean response time 
were excluded from further analysis of the response time data.” (Ritter et al., 2015, p. 
181) 
“First, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was conducted to ascertain a normal distribution 
of behavioral data and population parameters. Then linear associations between LSAS 
and the other population parameters (age, gender, MWT-B, BDI-II, STAI-X1/X2, 
PhoPhiKat-45) were investigated using bivariate correlation analyses. For normally 
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distributed and dichotomous parameters the Pearson coefficient (r) was employed, and 
for non-normally distributed parameters the Spearman coefficient (rs).  
Subsequently, in order to evaluate the influence of cognitive reappraisal (i.e., the task-
effect), cue modality and laughter type as well as SA on the evaluation of laughter, a 2 
× 2 × 3 repeated- measures ANOVA with task (SELF, OTHER), modality (A, AV) and 
laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) as within-subject factors and LSAS-scores as covariate 
was conducted for each of the two outcome parameters. The results were Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected, in order to account for potential violations of sphericity (Geisser and 
Greenhouse, 1958). Main effects of the within-subject factors and their interactions 
were further examined using post-hoc t-tests on the outcome parameters after 
correction for the variance associated with LSAS-scores.  
The exact nature of interaction effects between LSAS and the within-subject factors was 
elucidated using a twofold post-hoc analysis: 1.) Regression analyses between LSAS 
and the separate factor levels of the respective within-subject factor in order to identify 
those factor levels which exhibit a significant interaction with LSAS. 2.) Regression 
analyses between LSAS and the individual outcome differences between the separate 
factor levels.  
Then, it was tested whether the observed linear associations between SA and behavioral 
correlates of laughter perception proved to be specific for SA after correction for 
potential confounders. To this end, partial correlations with the LSAS-scores as 
independent variable, the outcome parameters as dependent variables and the 
parameters linearly associated with LSAS as controlling variables were conducted. Due 
to the fact that solely the persistence of initially observed effects was tested and not a 
change in the direction of the linear association after including the control variables in 
the model, one-sided testing was applied for the partial correlations.  
Finally, a linear relationship between observed interpretation and attention biases was 
investigated using a bivariate correlation analysis (Pearson).” (Ritter et al., 2015, p. 
181) 
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2.4 Ethics 
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Tübingen and 
was performed in accordance with the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association 
(Declaration of Helsinki). Written informed consent was given by all subjects before 
inclusion in the study.  
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3. Results 
3.1 Pre-studies 
3.1.1 Laughter type 
Raw hit rates (table 5) as well as unbiased hit rates (table 6) including their standard 
deviation (SD) for each laughter type (joyful laughter, tickling laughter, taunting 
laughter) and each modality (auditory, visual, audiovisual) are shown in the following:  
Table 5. Raw hit rates (rhr) for each laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) and each 
modality (A, V, AV) 
   Modality 
A V AV TOTAL 
Laughter Type rhr SD rhr SD rhr SD rhr SD 
TAU 0.50 0.14 0.30 0.10 0.56 0.13 0.45 0.11 
TIC 0.74 0.08 0.67 0.15 0.71 0.10 0.71 0.09 
JOY 0.72 0.15 0.80 0.07 0.78 0.12 0.77 0.10 
TOTAL 0.65 0.06 0.59 0.07 0.68 0.07 0.64 0.06 
 
 
Table 6. Unbiased hit rates (Hu) for each laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) and each 
modality (A, V, AV) 
   Modality 
A V AV TOTAL 
Laughter Type Hu SD Hu SD Hu SD Hu SD 
TAU 0.41 0.12 0.24 0.09 0.46 0.11 0.37 0.09 
TIC 0.35 0.06 0.27 0.08 0.36 0.08 0.33 0.06 
JOY 0.41 0.11 0.39 0.07 0.48 0.11 0.42 0.09 
TOTAL 0.39 0.07 0.30 0.07 0.43 0.09 0.37 0.07 
 
 
T-tests between unbiased hit rates and respective posterior probabilities showed 
significant differences for each laughter type in each modality (table 7): 
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Table 7. T-tests between unbiased hit rates (Hu) and respective posterior 
probabilites (pp) 
  M SD SEM t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Pair 1 Hu _A_TAU - pp_A_TAU 0.24 0.09 0.02 10.501 13 0.000 
Pair 2 Hu _A_TIC - pp_A_TIC 0.30 0.08 0.02 14.454 13 0.000 
Pair 3 Hu _A_JOY- pp_A_JOY 0.33 0.12 0.03 10.339 13 0.000 
Pair 4 Hu _V_TAU - pp_V_TAU 0.13 0.07 0.02 7.131 13 0.000 
Pair 5 Hu _V_TIC - pp_V_TIC 0.21 0.09 0.02 9.022 13 0.000 
Pair 6 Hu _V_JOY - pp_V_JOY 0.28 0.09 0.02 11.738 13 0.000 
Pair 7 Hu _AV_TAU - pp_AV_TAU 0.29 0.09 0.01 11.690 13 0.000 
Pair 8 Hu _AV_TIC - pp_AV_TIC 0.32 0.09 0.02 13.551 13 0.000 
Pair 9 Hu _AV_JOY -pp_AV_JOY 0.41 0.13 0.03 11.612 13 0.000 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Raw hit rates (dark grey), unbiased hit rates (middle grey) and posterior probalities 
(light grey) for each laughter type and each modality 
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The 3 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA is shown in table 8: 
Table 8. ANOVA for laughter ratings with modality (A, V, AV) and laughter type 
(TAU, TIC, JOY) as within-subject factors (results were Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected) 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
mod 0.475 1.674 0.284 49.354 0.000 
Error(mod) 0.125 21.762 0.006     
ltype 0.247 1.908 0.129 12.009 0.000 
Error(ltype) 0.267 24.798 0.011     
mod * ltype 0.13 3.229 0.04 13.712 0.000 
Error(mod*ltype) 0.123 41.973 0.003     
 
 
The following main effects were revealed to be significant: 
1. Modality (F(1.67, 21.76) = 49.35, p < 0.001): Post-hoc t-tests showed significant 
differences between all three modalities: AV and A (t(13) = 3.18, p = 0.007), 
AV and V (t(13) = 8.37, p < 0.001), and A and V (t(13) = 8.41, p < 0.001). The 
highest recognition rate was found in the audiovisual modality (m = 0.43, SD = 
0.09) followed by the auditory modality (m = 0.39, SD = 0.07). The lowest 
recognition rate was found in the visual modality (m = 0.30, SD = 0.07). 
2. Laughter type (F(1.91, 24.80) = 12.01, p < 0.001): Post-hoc t-tests revealed that 
joyful laughter (m = 0.42, SD = 0.09) had a higher recognition rate than taunting 
laughter (m = 0.37, SD = 0.09; t(13) = 2.79, p = 0.015) and tickling laughter (m 
= 0.33, SD = 0.06; t(13) = 5.06, p < 0.001) while there was no significant 
difference between taunting laughter and tickling laughter (t(13) = 2.12, p = 
0.054). 
3. Interaction between modality and laughter type (F(3.23, 41.97) = 13.71, p < 
0.001): This interaction is due to a different distribution of the recognition rates 
of the three laughter types in the three modalities: For taunting laughter, the 
unbiased hit rates significantly differed from each other in each modality: A: m 
= 0.41, SD = 0.12; V: m = 0.24, SD = 0.09, AV = 0.46, SD = 0.11; AV-A: t(13) 
= 2.68, p  = 0.019; AV-V: t(13) = 9.30, p < 0.001; A-V: t(13) = 9.15, p < 0.001. 
For tickling laughter, the visual modality had significant lower unbiased hit rates 
(m = 0.27, SD = 0.08) than the auditory modality (m = 0.35, SD = 0.06; t(13) = 
4.59, p = 0.001) and the audiovisual one (m = 0.36; SD = 0.08; t(13) = 4.78, p < 
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0.001) while there was no significant difference between the unbiased hit rates 
for the audiovisual and auditory modality (t(13) = 0.56, p = 0.589). For joyful 
laughter, the audiovisual modality (m = 0.48, SD = 0.11) had significant higher 
unbiased hit rates than the auditory modalitiy (m = 0.41, SD = 0.11; t(13) = 
4.24, p = 0.001) and the visual modality (m = 0.39, SD = 0.07; t(13) = 4.62, p < 
0.001) while no significant difference could be revealed between the unbiased 
hit rates for the auditory and visual modality (t(13) = 1.11, p = 0.286). 
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Figure 3. Laughter type main effects 
a) shows the unbiased hit rates for the three modalities auditory (A), visual (V) and audiovisual 
(AV); b) shows the unbiased hit rates for the three laughter types taunting laughter (TAU), 
tickling laughter (TIC) and joyful laughter (JOY); c) shows the interaction effect of modality and 
laughter type. 
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3.1.2 Valence 
The mean valence ratings for each laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) are shown in table 9: 
Table 9. Valence ratings for each laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) including their 
number (N), mean (M), standard deviation (SD), standard error of the mean 
(SEM), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) 
  N M SD SEM Min Max 
TAU 303 5.09 1.64 0.09 1.07 7.93 
TIC 108 6.46 0.94 0.09 3.36 7.93 
JOY 150 6.25 0.78 0.06 3.71 8.21 
TOTAL 561 5.67 1.48 0.06 1.07 8.21 
 
A Levene’s test detected heteroscedasticity of the three laughter types (Levene-statistic 
= 68.8, p < 0.001). Therefore, the ANOVA with laughter type as factor was corrected 
using the Welch’s t-test. This revealed a main effect for laughter type (t = 66.5, p < 
0.001). Post-hoc tests which were again corrected for heteroscedasticity showed that 
TAU was significantly rated as being more negative than JOY (t(450.6) = –10.16, p < 
0.001) and TIC (t(328.9) = –10.47, p < 0.001) while there was no significant difference 
between TIC and JOY (t(256) = 1.95, p = 0.052). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean valence ratings for each laughter type 
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3.1.3 Arousal 
The mean arousal ratings for each laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) are shown in table 
10: 
Table 10. Arousal ratings for each laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) including their 
number (N), mean (M), standard deviation (SD), standard error of the mean 
(SEM), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) 
  N M SD SEM Min Max 
TAU 303 5.62 1.50 0.09 1.86 8.50 
TIC 108 7.24 0.92 0.09 4.50 8.93 
JOY 150 4.55 0.96 0.08 2.14 6.64 
TOTAL 561 5.65 1.56 0.07 1.86 8.93 
 
A Levene’s test detected heteroscedasticity of the three laughter types (Levene-statistic 
= 28.3, p < 0.001). Therefore, the ANOVA with laughter type as factor was corrected 
using the Welch’s t-test. This revealed a main effect for laughter type (t = 260.8, p < 
0.001). Post-hoc tests which were again corrected for heteroscedasticity showed that 
TIC was significantly rated to have a higher arousal than TAU (t(308.0) = 13.09, p < 
0.001) and JOY (t(256) = 22.70, p < 0.001) while TAU was significantly rated to have a 
higher arousal than JOY (t(423.3) = 9.28, p < 0.001). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean arousal ratings for each laughter type 
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3.1.4 Dominance 
The mean dominance ratings for each laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) are shown in 
table 11: 
Table 11. Dominance ratings for each laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) including 
their number (N), mean (M), standard deviation (SD), standard error of the mean 
(SEM), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) 
  N M SD SEM Min Max 
TAU 303 5.77 0.87 0.05 2.79 8.07 
TIC 108 5.38 0.68 0.07 3.79 6.93 
JOY 150 4.57 0.77 0.06 2.86 6.43 
TOTAL 561 5.37 0.96 0.04 2.79 8.07 
 
 
Since there was no indication for heteroscedasticity (Levene-statistic = 2.2, p = 0.108) a 
one-way ANOVA was conducted which revealed a main effect for laughter type (F(2) = 
108.41, p < 0.001). TAU was significantly rated as expressing more dominance than 
TIC (t(241.1) = 4.66, p < 0.001) and JOY (t(451) = 14.22, p < 0.001) while TIC was 
significantly rated as expressing more dominance than JOY (t(256) = 8.74, p < 0.001). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean dominance ratings for each laughter type 
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3.1.5 Authenticity 
The mean authenticity ratings for each laughter types (TAU, TIC, JOY) are shown in 
table 12: 
Table 12. Authenticity ratings for each laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) including 
their number (N), mean (M), standard deviation (SD), standard error of the mean 
(SEM), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) 
  N M SD SEM Min Max 
TAU 101 4.53 1.75 0.17 1.57 8.07 
TIC 36 5.13 1.87 0.31 1.71 8.21 
JOY 50 5.76 1.25 0.18 2.71 7.50 
TOTAL 187 4.97 1.73 0.13 1.57 8.21 
 
 
141 stimuli received a mean authenticity rating ≥ 3.5. 
 
Figure 7. Authenticity ratings 
a) shows mean authenticity ratings for each laughter type; b) shows mean authenticity ratings for 
each stimulus. The horizontal line marks the cutoff line of 3.5. 
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3.2 Main study 
The following chapter is partly adopted from Ritter et al. (2015) where the main results 
of the main study have been published before. Respective passages are put in quotation 
marks and italics. 
 
3.2.1 Population parameters 
“A normal distribution was ascertained for the behavioral variables as well as for all 
population parameters (…) with the exception of gender and state anxiety (STAI-X1). 
LSAS scores were found to be correlated with general state anxiety (STAI-X1: rs = 
0.59, p < 0.001), general trait anxiety (STAI- X2: r = 0.45, p < 0.001), gelotophobia (r 
= 0.83, p < 0.001) and BDI-II scores (r = 0.49, p < 0.001). LSAS scores were not 
significantly associated with verbal intelligence (MWT-B), age or gender (abs(r) ≤ 0.08, 
p > 0.05).” (Ritter et al., 2015, p. 181) 
 56 
Table 13. Correlations between LSAS, MWT, BDI, gelotophobia, STAI-X2 and 
age. ** indicates that correlation is significant on the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  LSAS MWT BDI Gelotophobia STAI X2 Age 
LSAS 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -0.023 0.488
** 0.833** 0.447** -0.076 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0.864 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.563 
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 
MWT 
Pearson 
Correlation -0.023 1 -0.059 0.028 -0.236 0.417
** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.864   0.652 0.829 0.070 0.001 
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 
BDI 
Pearson 
Correlation 0.488
** -0.059 1 0.418** 0.368** -0.042 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.652   0.001 0.004 0.750 
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Gelotophobia 
Pearson 
Correlation 0.833
** 0.028 0.418** 1 0.491** -0.034 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.829 0.001   0.000 0.797 
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 
STAI-X2 
Pearson 
Correlation 0.447
** -0.236 0.368** 0.491** 1 -0.092 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.070 0.004 0.000   0.482 
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Age 
Pearson 
Correlation -0.076 0.417
** -0.042 -0.034 -0.092 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.563 0,001 0.750 0.797 0.482   
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 
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Table 14. Correlations between LSAS, STAI-X1 and gender 
** indicates that correlation is significant on the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
  LSAS STAI X1 Gender 
Spearman's rho 
LSAS 
Correlation 
Coefficient 1 0.592
** -0.041 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000 0.753 
N 60 60 60 
STAI X1 
Correlation 
Coefficient 0.592
** 1 0.194 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000  0.137 
N 60 60 60 
Gender 
Correlation 
Coefficient -0.041 0.194 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.753 0.137  
N 60 60 60 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Correlations between LSAS and a) BDI, b) MWT, c) age, and d) gender 
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Figure 9. Correlations between LSAS and a) gelotophobia, b) STAI-X1, and c) STAI-X2 
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3.2.2 Laughter ratings 
The mean laughter ratings for each task (SELF, OTHER), each modality (A, AV) and 
each laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) are shown in table 15: 
Table 15. Mean laughter ratings for each task (SELF, OTHER), each modality (A, 
AV) and each laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) 
 
Modality 
 
A AV TOTAL 
Laughter 
Type SELF OTHER TOTAL SELF OTHER TOTAL SELF OTHER TOTAL 
TAU 
SD 
2.19 
0.36 
2.09 
0.35 
2.14 
0.33 
2.16 
0.34 
2.02 
0.35 
2.09 
0.32 
2.17 
0.31 
2.05 
0.30 
2.11 
0.28 
TIC 
SD 
2.55 
0.57 
2.59 
0.55 
2.57 
0.53 
2.55 
0.53 
2.58 
0.52 
2.56 
0.50 
2.55 
0.51 
2.58 
0.51 
2.57 
0.49 
JOY 
SD 
3.03 
0.35 
3.17 
0.40 
3.10 
0.35 
3.00 
0.34 
3.07 
0.34 
3.03 
0.31 
3.02 
0.32 
3.12 
0.33 
3.07 
0.30 
TOTAL 
SD 
2.59 
0.31 
2.61 
0.35 
2.60 
0.31 
2.57 
0.27 
2.55 
0.27 
2.56 
0.25 
2.58 
0.26 
2.58 
0.28 
2.58 
0.25 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Mean laughter ratings for each task, each modality and each laughter type 
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The 2 × 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA is shown in table 15: 
Table 16. ANOVA for laughter ratings with task (SELF, OTHER), modality (A, 
AV) and laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) as within-subject factors and LSAS-
scores as covariate (results were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
task 0.232 1 0.232 2.239 0.140 
task * LSAS 0.357 1 0.357 3.455 0.068 
Error(task) 6.001 58 0.103     
mod 1.664 1 1.664 10.301 0.002 
mod * LSAS 1.522 1 1.522 9.422 0.003 
Error(mod) 9.368 58 0.162     
ltype 61.868 1.605 38.539 74.302 0.000 
ltype * LSAS 2.254 1.605 1.404 2.707 0.083 
Error(ltype) 48.294 93.108 0.519     
task * mod 0.083 1 0.083 2.269 0.137 
task * mod * LSAS 0.027 1 0.027 0.728 0.397 
Error(task*mod) 2.129 58 0.037     
task * ltype 1.001 1.939 0.516 15.507 0.000 
task * ltype * LSAS 0.095 1.939 0.049 1.473 0.234 
Error(task*ltype) 3.745 112.491 0.033     
mod * ltype 0.112 1.811 0.062 0.979 0.372 
mod * ltype * LSAS 0.231 1.811 0.127 2.019 0.142 
Error(mod*ltype) 6.621 105.032 0.063     
task * mod * ltype 0.044 1.993 0.022 0.988 0.375 
task * mod * ltype * LSAS 0.018 1.993 0.009 0.392 0.676 
Error(task*mod*ltype) 2.596 115.618 0.022     
 
 
The following main effects were revealed to be significant. As described before, main 
effects of the within-subject factors and their interactions were further examined after 
correction of the laughter ratings for the variance associated with LSAS-scores. In the 
following, both raw mean laughter ratings (M) and laughter ratings corrected for the 
variance associated with LSAS (Mcorr) including their standard deviation are shown: 
1. Modality (F(1, 58) = 10.30, p = 0.002): Stimuli presented only in the auditory 
modality were rated as being more socially inclusive (M = 2.60, SD = 0.31; 
Mcorr = 2.79, SD = 0.27) than audiovisual ones (M = 2.56, SD = 0.25; Mcorr = 
2.64, SD = 0.24). 
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2. Laughter type (F(1.61, 93.11) = 74.30, p < 0.001): Post-hoc t-tests showed 
significant differences between all three laughter types: TAU and TIC (t(59) = -
10.37, p < 0.001),  TAU and JOY (t(59) = -24.10, P < 0.001), and TIC and JOY 
(t(59) = -7.23, p < 0.001). The laughter type with the most social exclusive 
ratings was TAU (M = 2.11, SD = 0.28; Mcorr = 2.15, SD = 0.28), followed by 
TIC (M = 2.57, SD = 0.49; Mcorr = 2.73, SD = 0.47) and JOY (M = 3.07, SD = 
0.30; Mcorr = 3.25, SD = 0.25). 
3. Task X laughter type (F(1.94, 112.49) = 15.51, p < 0.001): Under the SELF-
condition mean laughter ratings of TAU got more positive (MSELF = 2.17 (SD = 
0.31), Mcorr_SELF = 2.20 (SD = 0.31); MOTHER = 2.05 (SD = 0.30), Mcorr_OTHER = 
2.10 (SD = 0.29); diffSELF-OTHER = +0.12, diffcorr_SELF-OTHER = +0.10) whereas 
TIC and JOY got more negative (JOY: MSELF = 3.02 (SD = 0.32), Mcorr_SELF = 
3.17 (SD = 0.29); MOTHER = 3.12 (SD = 0.33), Mcorr_OTHER = 3.33 (SD = 0.27); 
diffSELF-OTHER = -0.10, diffcorr_SELF-OTHER = -0.16; TIC: MSELF = 2.55 (SD = 0.51), 
Mcorr_SELF = 2.68 (SD = 0.50); MOTHER = 2.58 (SD = 0.51), Mcorr_OTHER = 2.80 
(SD = 0.47); diffSELF-OTHER = -0.03, diffcorr_SELF-OTHER = -0.12). Using post-hoc t-
tests between these differences it could be revealed that there were significant 
differences between TAU and JOY (t(59) = -8.75, p < 0.001), and TAU and TIC 
(t(59) = -6.52, p < 0.001) while there was no significant difference between the 
differences between the two task conditions of TIC and JOY (t(59) = -1.11, p = 
0.270). 
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Figure 11. Laughter rating main effects 
1a) and 1b) show laughter ratings for each modality: 1a) raw mean laughter ratings, 1b) mean 
laughter ratings corrected for LSAS-scores;  
2a) and 2b) show laughter ratings for each laughter type: 2a) raw mean laughter ratings; 2b) mean 
laughter ratings corrected for LSAS-sores; 
3a) and 3b) show the interaction effect between task and laughter type with raw mean laughter 
ratings (3a) and mean laughter ratings corrected for LSAS-scores (3b). 
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“Interactions between social anxiety (LSAS) as covariate and the within-subject 
factors: 
1. Overall laughter ratings X LSAS (F(1,58) = 14.6, p < 0.001): The post-hoc 
regression analysis indicated a significant negative relationship between social 
anxiety scores (LSAS) and the overall laughter rating (β = -0.004, t(58) = -3.82, 
p < 0.001). This association was confirmed for both tasks (t(58) ≥ -2.86, p ≤ 
0.006), both modalities (t(58) ≥ -2.12, p ≤ 0.038) and the three laughter types 
(t(58) ≥ -2.46, p ≤ 0.017), except for TAU (p = 0.351). 
2. Modality X LSAS (F(1, 58) = 9.42, p = 0.003): The tendency to rate laughter as 
more unfriendly with increasing social anxiety was greater under the auditory 
than under the audiovisual condition. This effect can be described in the 
negative linear relationship between the individual mean laughter rating 
difference for the two modalities (i.e., A-AV) and LSAS (β = -0.004, t(58) = -
3.07 , p = 0.003).” (Ritter et al., 2015, p. 181f) 
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Figure 12. Relationship between laughter rating and social anxiety scores 
a) shows the linear association between overall mean laughter rating and LSAS-SR scores. b) 
shows the linear associationn between laughter rating and LSAS-SR scores for the two modalities: 
auditory (light grey) and audiovisual (dark grey).  
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“No significant interaction was observed between LSAS and the factors Task [F(1, 58) 
= 3.46, p = 0.068] and Laughter Type [F(1.61, 93.11) = 2.71, p = 0.083]. Finally all 2nd 
or 3rd order interactions for LSAS and the within-subject factors were non-significant. 
For the detected interaction effects between mean laughter ratings and LSAS, the 
partial correlation analyses controlling for general state anxiety (STAI-X1), general 
trait anxiety (STAI-X2), gelotophobia and depressive symptoms (BDI-II) led to the 
following results: 
1.) Overall laughter ratings: The negative linear relationship between LSAS and the 
mean overall laughter rating (r = -0.45, p < 0.001) remained significant after 
controlling for STAI-X1 (r = -0.47, p < 0.001), STAI-X2 (r = -0.41, p = 0.001) 
and BDI-II (r = -0.42, p = 0.001). However, after controlling for gelotophobia, 
the strength of the relationship was reduced to a non-significant level (r = -0.21, 
p > 0.05). 
2.) Mean laughter rating difference between the modalities A and AV: The 
correlation between LSAS and the individual mean laughter rating difference A-
AV (r = -0.37, p = 0.002) as a measure of the interaction between LSAS and the 
factor modality remained significant after controlling for STAI-X1 (r = -0.29, p 
= 0.013), STAI-X2 (r = -0.28, p = 0.016) and BDI-II (r = -0.42, p < 0.001), but 
not after controlling for gelotophobia (r = -0.08, p > 0.05).” (Ritter et al., 2015, 
p. 182) 
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3.2.3 Response times 
The mean response times for each task (SELF, OTHER), each modality (A, AV) and 
each laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) are shown in table 17: 
Table 17. Mean response times for each task (SELF, OTHER), each modality (A, 
AV) and each laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) (in ms) 
 
Modality 
 
A AV TOTAL 
Laughter 
Type SELF OTHER TOTAL SELF OTHER TOTAL SELF OTHER TOTAL 
TAU 
SD 
2789 
556 
2727 
515 
2758 
521 
2744 
462 
2709 
487 
2727 
459 
2766 
484 
2718 
470 
2742 
465 
TIC 
SD 
2885 
547 
2850 
547 
2868 
533 
2859 
518 
2842 
522 
2850 
503 
2872 
509 
2846 
500 
2859 
494 
JOY 
SD 
2785 
548 
2640 
508 
2712 
509 
2805 
466 
2692 
451 
2748 
438 
2795 
478 
2666 
459 
2730 
456 
TOTAL 
SD 
2819 
531 
2739 
506 
2779 
509 
2803 
462 
2748 
466 
2775 
453 
2811 
476 
2743 
463 
2777 
462 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Mean response times for each task, each modality and each laughter type (in s) 
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The 2 × 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA is shown in table 18: 
Table 18. ANOVA for response times with task (SELF, OTHER), modality (A, 
AV) and laughter type (TAU, TIC, JOY) as within-subject factors and LSAS-
scores as covariate (results were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
task 91606.069 1 91606.069 0.41 0.524 
task * LSAS 85661.08 1 85661.08 0.384 0.538 
Error(task) 12947120.55 58 223226.216     
mod 843411.427 1 843411.427 8.821 0.004 
mod * LSAS 73.061.329 1 73061.329 0.764 0.386 
Error(mod) 5545890.956 58 95618.81     
ltype 2023491.377 1.98 1021945.856 16.122 0.000 
ltype * LSAS 536320.914 1.98 270863.984 4.273 0.017 
Error(ltype) 7279718.545 114.842 63388.887     
task * mod 22015.646 1 22015.646 0.633 0.429 
task * mod * LSAS 2854.591 1 2854.591 0.082 0.775 
Error(task*mod) 2016362.602 58 34764.872     
task * ltype 129736.611 1.924 67413.875 2.704 0.073 
task * ltype * LSAS 185247.619 1.924 96258.563 3.861 0.025 
Error(task*ltype) 2782469.208 111.62 24928.096     
mod * ltype 266507.561 1.813 146994.659 4.872 0.012 
mod * ltype * LSAS 47760.479 1.813 26342.725 0.873 0.411 
Error(mod*ltype) 3172977.18 105.156 30173.867     
task * mod * ltype 32934.711 1.975 16675.106 0.819 0.442 
task * mod * ltype * LSAS 58314.155 1.975 29524.921 1.45 0.239 
Error(task*mod*ltype) 2332531.774 114.555 20361.714     
 
 
The following main effects were revealed to be significant. As described before, main 
effects of the within-subject factors and their interactions were further examined after 
correction of the response times for the variance associated with LSAS-scores. In the 
following, both raw mean response times (M) and response times corrected for the 
variance associated with LSAS (Mcorr) including their standard deviation are shown: 
1. Modality (F(1,58) = 8.82, p  = 0.004): Participants were significantly slower to 
respond to unimodally auditorily presented stimuli (M = 2779 ms, SD = 509 ms; 
Mcorr = 2726 ms, SD = 479 ms) than to audiovisual ones (M = 2775, SD = 453 
ms; Mcorr = 2624 ms, SD = 463 ms; t(59) = 4.58, p < 0.001). 
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2. Laughter type (F(1.98, 114.84) = 16.12, p < 0.001): Responses to TIC were 
slower than to JOY (t(59) = 8.82, p < 0.001) and TAU (t(59) = 4.98, p < 0.001). 
while the responses to TAU were slower than to JOY (t(59) = 3.59, p = 0.001). 
The mean response times were: TAU: M = 2742 ms (SD = 465 ms), Mcorr = 
2659 ms (SD = 467 ms); TIC: M = 2859 ms (SD = 494 ms), Mcorr = 2778 ms 
(SD = 500 ms); JOY: M = 2730 ms (SD = 456 ms), Mcorr = 2580 ms (SD = 451 
ms).  
3. Modality X laughter type (F(1.81, 105.16) = 4.87, p = 0.012): A modality effect 
could be shown to be significant for JOY (t(59) = 5.91, p < 0.001; MA = 2712 
ms (SD = 509 ms), Mcorr_A = 2670 ms (SD = 480 ms); MAV = 2748 ms (SD = 
438 ms), Mcorr_AV = 2491 ms (SD = 452 ms); diffA-AV = -36 ms, diffcorr_A-AV = 
179 ms) as well as for TAU (t(59) = 3.58, p = 0.001; MA = 2758 ms (SD = 521 
ms), Mcorr_A = 2708 ms (SD = 489 ms); MAV = 2727 ms (SD = 459 ms), Mcorr_AV 
= 2610 ms (SD = 470 ms); diffA-AV = 31 ms, diffcorr_A-AV = 98 ms), but not for 
TIC (t(59) = 1.28, p = 0.205; MA = 2868 ms (SD = 533 ms), Mcorr_A = 2796 ms 
(SD = 515 ms); MAV = 2850 ms (SD = 503 ms), Mcorr_AV = 2760 ms (SD = 509 
ms); diffA-AV = 18 ms, diffcorr_A-AV = 36 ms.).  
 69 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Response time main effects 
1a) and 1b) show response times for each modality: 1a) raw mean response times, 1b) mean 
response times corrected for LSAS-scores; 
2a) and 2b) show response times for each laughter type: 2a) raw mean response times, 2b) mean 
response times corrected for LSAS-scores;  
3a) and 3b) show the interaction effect between modality and laughter type with raw mean 
response times (3a) and mean response times corrected for LSAS-scores (3b). 
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“Interactions between social anxiety (LSAS) as covariate and the within-subject 
factors:  
1. Laughter type X LSAS (F(2.0,114.8) = 4.3, p = 0.017): Increasing social anxiety 
was significantly associated with an increasing mean response time difference 
between JOY and TAU (β = 2.35; t(58) = 2.7, p = 0.008). Such an association 
was also observed for the difference between JOY and TIC (β = 2.16; t(58) = 
2.5, p = 0.017), but not for the difference between TIC and TAU (β =  0.20; 
t(58) = 0.2, p = 0.835).  
2. Task X laughter type X LSAS (F(1.9, 111.6) = 3.9, p = 0.025): The linear 
relationship between LSAS and the response time difference between JOY and 
TAU was present under both task conditions (SELF: β = 2.41; t(58) = 2.6, p = 
0.011; OTHER: β = 2.29; t(58) = 2.1, p = 0.037) with no significant difference 
in this association between the task conditions (β = 0.12; t(58) = 0.1, p > 0.05). 
In contrast, the linear relationship between LSAS and the response time 
difference between JOY and TIC was significant only under the OTHER 
condition (β = 3.45; t(58) = 3.5, p = 0.001) and was significantly greater under 
the OTHER than under the SELF condition (β = 2.6; t(58) = 2.2, p = 0.035). 
The linear association between LSAS and the response time difference between 
TAU and TIC, however, was non-significant for both task conditions (all abs(β) 
≤ 1.55, all abs(t(58)) ≤ 1.4, all p > 0.05).  
None of the remaining main effects or interactions between within- and between-subject 
factors was found to be significant.” (Ritter et al., 2015, p. 182) 
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Figure 15. Relationship between response time differences of two of the three laughter types and 
social anxiety  
a) shows the relationship under both task conditions, b) under the SELF-condition, and c) under 
the OTHER-condition. 
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“For the detected interaction between LSAS and laughter type and the 2nd order 
interaction between LSAS, task and laughter type, partial correlations with STAI-X1, 
STAI-X2, gelotophobia, and BDI-II as control variables revealed the following results: 
The linear relationship between LSAS and the response time difference JOY-TAU (r = 
0.34, p = 0.004) remained significant after controlling for STAI-X1 (r = 0.26, p = 
0.024), STAI-X2 (r = 0.29, p = 0.013) and BDI-II (r = 0.25, p = 0.030), but not after 
controlling for gelotophobia (r = 0.02, p > 0.05). The relationship between LSAS and 
the response time difference JOY-TIC (r = 0.31, p = 0.009), on the other hand, was 
rendered insignificant after controlling for STAI-X1, STAI-X2, BDI-II, or gelotophobia 
(all r ≤ 0.19, all p > 0.05). Similarly, the linear relationship between LSAS and the 
increase in response time differences between JOY and TIC under the OTHER 
condition as compared to the SELF condition (r = 0.27, p = 0.018) driving the observed 
interaction between task, laughter type and LSAS became non-significant after 
controlling for STAI-X1 or BDI-II (all r ≤ 0.18, all p > 0.05). After controlling for 
STAI-X2 or gelotophobia, however, this linear relationship retained its statistical 
significance (all r ≥ 0.25, all p ≤ 0.029).” (Ritter et al., 2015, p. 182) 
 
3.2.4 Correlation of laughter ratings and response times 
“Overall mean laughter ratings and response time differences between JOY and TAU 
were found to be significantly correlated (r = 0.24, p = 0.009).” (Ritter et al., 2015, p. 
182) 
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4. Discussion 
To my knowledge, this is the first behavioral study using multimodal laughter stimuli to 
investigate information processing biases in SA and the effects of cognitive reappraisal 
as a means of emotion regulation on biased perception although simultaneously, another 
study based on the same stimulus material validated in the current study was conducted 
in order to investigate cerebral mediators of cognitive biases in SA using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (Kreifelts et al., 2014). 
 
4.1 Pre-studies 
As described in the introduction chapter, the aim of the pre-studies was to validate the 
produced stimulus material and, based on this validation, to select appropriate stimuli 
for eliciting information processing biases in SA. 
 
4.1.1 Laughter type 
The three laughter types joyful laughter, tickling laughter and taunting laughter were 
recognizable based on the auditory, visual and audiovisual signal represented by 
significant differences between unbiased hit rates and posterior probabilities for each 
laughter type and each modality. Therefore, the basic prerequisite for the validity of the 
present study is met. 
The pre-study also showed an integration effect for laughter represented by significantly 
higher unbiased hit rates for audiovisually presented stimuli than for unimodally 
presented ones. Likewise, the two unimodal modalities differed significantly from each 
other in their unbiased hit rates with auditorily presented stimuli being more often 
recognized than visual ones suggesting that the emotional information conveyed by 
laughter is mainly carried by the auditory signal. Therefore, laughter seems to be 
different to other nonverbal emotional cues for which an opposite pattern of modality-
dependent effects could be shown in previous research: Lambrecht et al. (2014) 
presented dynamic stimuli with congruent facial and prosodic expressions of five 
emotional categories in three different sensory modalities (A, V, AV) to healthy 
participants, which resulted in higher recognition rates for visually than for auditorily 
presented stimuli. Likewise, using dynamic visual and non-linguistic video clips 
expressing fear and disgust, Collignon et al. (2008) found a visual dominance in affect 
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perception displayed by the tendency of participants to categorize emotional 
expressions which were incongruent in the two modalities based on the vocal signal. 
However, when the reliability of the visual signal was reduced by adjusting the visual 
signal-to-noise ratio of the video clips to a lower level, individuals based their 
categorizing of incongruent bimodal stimuli preferentially on the auditory modality. 
Under the assumption that the emotional information of laughter is mainly conveyed by 
the auditory signal and thus, the visual signal has a much lower reliability than the 
auditory one, the finding of the present study that the recognizability of auditorily 
presented stimuli was significantly higher than those presented in the visual modality 
are in line with the results of Collignon et al. 
Moreover, the data of the pre-study show that although all three laughter types were 
best recognized in the audiovisual modality and worst recognized in the visual one, the 
differences between the unbiased hit rates of the single modalities varied significantly 
between the laughter types: For taunting laughter, recognition rates were significantly 
different from each other in each modality; for tickling laughter, recognition rates in the 
audiovisual and auditory modality were similar (i.e., no significant difference); for 
joyful laughter, there was no significant difference between the auditory and the visual 
modality. This finding suggests that the sensory modality by which the emotional 
information of laughter is mainly conveyed may vary for different laughter types. Since 
recognition rates for taunting laughter were considerably lower in the visual modality 
than in die auditory modality in comparison to the other laughter types (for joyful 
laughter, the difference between A and V was not even significant) and these 
recognition rates for taunting laughter were in the visual modality even lower than 
recognition rates for tickling laughter, it can be assumed that the higher reliability of the 
acoustic signal may be driven by misattributions of visually presented taunting laughter. 
 
 4.1.2 Valence 
Joyful laughter was rated as being more positive than taunting laughter. This finding fits 
to the hypotheses proposed about the dimensional rating of laughter which were based 
on the PAD emotional state model (Russell and Mehrabian, 1977) since joyful laughter 
serves the social function of group bonding (Provine, 2013) and thus, the laughing 
person intends to convey a pleasant emotional state to the addressed person. Taunting 
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laughter, on the other hand, rather serves the function of social segregation (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt, 1970) and hence, intends to convey an unpleasant emotional state to the 
laughter-perceiving individuals. 
Further, tickling laughter was as well rated as being more positive than taunting 
laughter. This can also be explained by the function of the different laughter types: The 
evolutionary old laughter type of tickling laughter serves the reinforcement of play 
behavior (Panksepp and Burgdorf, 2003) which in the context of bodily interactions 
takes place within one’s social group and thus conveys a rather pleasant emotional state. 
In the present study, tickling laughter had even a higher mean valence rating (6.46) than 
joyful laughter (6.25), which, however, did not proof to be a significant difference so 
that it cannot be concluded that there are differences in the pleasantness of joyful and 
tickling laughter. 
The findings that joyful and tickling laughter were rated as being more positive than 
taunting laughter, which can plausibly be explained, support the assumption that the 
utilized stimulus material is ecologically valid and suitable to investigate information 
processing biases in socially anxious individuals. 
 
4.1.3 Arousal 
The analysis of the mean arousal ratings showed that all three laughter types were rated 
significantly differently: Tickling laughter was rated to have the highest arousal 
followed by taunting laughter while joyful laughter was rated to have the lowest 
arousal. As especially very ticklish people know, being tickled represents a situation of 
high arousal, which also manifests in one’s behaviors such as laughing, blushing, 
screaming or even crying. In a self-report study, it could be shown that ticklish people 
also have greater propensities to giggling, laughing, blushing and crying in general 
(Fridlund and Loftis, 1990). A possible explanation for this could be that ticklish 
individuals exhibit a higher arousability suggesting that tickling laughter is associated 
with a highly aroused emotional state. Likewise, it was found that chimpanzees emit 
play panting which some researchers even call laughter (Goodall, 1989; Plooij, 1984) 
especially when they receive stimulation leading to a high arousal which can consist of 
being tickled but also of being chased or grabbed (Matsusaka, 2004). 
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The finding that taunting laughter was rated to express a higher arousal than joyful 
laughter may be due to the script the production of the video sequences was based on. 
This script instructed the actors to imitate joyful laughter by imagining a situation in 
which they meet an old friend whom they have not seen for a long time. Thus, the 
resulting laughter is an inviting welcoming laughter, but on a low degree of arousal. 
Nevertheless, joyful welcoming laughter in other situations may have a higher degree of 
arousal. For example, laughing at a joke is as well a joyful laughter which serves the 
social function of group bonding, but leads to a higher arousal level. Likewise, taunting 
laughter can appear in more or less strong aroused forms. It serves the function of social 
segregation (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970) and thus may elicit an emotional state of fear in the 
laughter-perceiving person which is an emotional state described by a high arousal 
(Russell and Mehrabian, 1977). The sender of the laughter, however, whose emotional 
state was asked to assess in the present study may vary in his/her arousal with respect to 
the concrete situation. 
 
4.1.4 Dominance 
Taunting laughter was rated to express more dominance than both of the other laughter 
types. This can be explained by the function taunting laughter serves in social 
communication: By aiming to socially segregate an individual by ridiculing and 
humiliating him/her through taunting laughter, the laughing person puts him-/herself in 
a dominant position, which leads to a feeling of submissiveness in the addressed 
individual. This is also reflected by findings about the PAD emotional state model 
which show that fear that is elicited through taunting laughter is very low on the 
dominance scale indicating a submissive feeling in the anxious person (Russell and 
Mehrabian, 1977). Since the task of the present study consisted of assessing what 
degree of dominance the presented stimuli express and not how the addressed persons 
feels, the ratings are inverse to the feelings of a fearing person, or to say in other words: 
The expression of dominance in a social cue leads to the feeling of submissiveness in 
the addressed person and vice versa. 
Joyful laughter, on the other hand, leads to pleasant emotions such as joy and happiness 
in the addressed individual and meanwhile serves the social function of group bonding 
(Provine, 2013). As the PAD emotional state models shows, these positive emotions are 
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connected with a high degree of dominance, i.e. joyful and happy individuals feel rather 
free to act in a variety of ways than to be urged to specific actions by a dominant person 
(Russell and Mehrabian, 1977). Therefore, it can be easily explained why in the present 
study, joyful laughter was rated to express least dominance of the three laughter types. 
Tickling laughter was significantly rated to express less dominance than taunting, but 
more dominance than joyful laughter. The reason for this may be similar to the 
explanation of the arousal ratings of tickling laughter: By empathizing with the tickled 
person, the participants of the present study may have felt rather submissive as a tickled 
person does as well since being tickled represents a situation in which one is at the 
mercy of the tickling person and can no longer control one’s own behavioral and 
vegetative responses such as laughing, screaming, blushing and even crying. As we 
defined dominance as the feeling of being free and unrestricted to act in a variety of 
way (Mehrabian, 1980), the emotional state while being tickled appears to be very un-
dominant. In opposition to taunting laughter, however, tickling is not intended to cause 
the addressed person negative social consequences and thus does not lead to anxious 
and fearful feelings in the addressed individual. This might be the reason why taunting 
laughter was rated as expressing even more dominance than tickling laughter. 
As explained, the hypothesis of the present study about the dominance rating of laughter 
was verified as well suggesting the applicability of the tested stimulus material for the 
investigation of information processing biases in SA. 
 
4.1.5 Authenticity 
With 141 out of 187 presented stimuli being rated above the defined limit (i.e., ≥ 3.5 on 
the 9-point SAM) the hypothesis that the majority of laughter stimuli would be assessed 
as being authentic was verified suggesting that the stimulus material is close enough to 
natural laughter in order to be utilized in a study about information processing biases in 
SA. 
Moreover, statistical analyses revealed that joyful laughter was significantly rated to be 
more authentic than taunting laughter while there was no significant difference between 
tickling laughter and each of the other laughter types. This might be due to the 
capability of the actors to express joyful laughter more authentic than taunting laughter 
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since actors tended to overexpress dominance to make their laughter taunting enough to 
be recognized. 
 
4.1.6 Selection of the stimulus material for the main study 
Since the hypotheses of the pre-studies all could be corroborated the present stimulus 
material appears to be ecologically valid and appropriate to evoke responses in 
stimulus-perceiving individuals that are close to those in natural social situations. 
Therefore, the present stimulus material seems to be particularly apt to evaluate 
information processing biases in socially anxious individuals. 
 
4.2 Main study 
4.2.1 Laughter main effects 
The main effects which were revealed by the two ANOVAs about laughter ratings and 
response times refer to the perception of laughter in general. Since in the data analysis, 
the main effects were investigated after correction of the outcome parameters for the 
variance associated with LSAS-score, these effects refer to a fictive population that is 
very low socially anxious with an LSAS-score of 0. In this chapter, first these main 
effects (first about laughter ratings, then about response times) will be discussed. 
Effects attributable to social anxiety will then be explained in the following. 
 
4.2.1.1 Laughter ratings 
In opposition to the pre-studies, in the main study stimuli were presented only in two 
modalities, auditory and audiovisual. Stimuli presented only in the auditory modality 
were rated as being more socially inclusive than audiovisual ones. This can be 
explained by the greater ambiguity of unimodally presented stimuli. As extendedly 
demonstrated in the introduction chapter, perception biases arise when individuals are 
faced with unclear and ambiguous situations. Since in the data analysis, the laughter 
rating main effects were investigated after correction of the outcome parameters for the 
variance associated with LSAS-score and thus, the ANOVA shows effects for a fictive 
population that is very low socially anxious with an LSAS-score of 0, the difference in 
the perception of the two modalities is indicative for a positive interpretation bias in low 
socially anxious individuals. This fits into previous research about information 
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processing biases in SA in which it was postulated that the interpretation bias in SA 
may be dichotomous: In two independent studies, Hirsch and Mathews (1997; 2000) 
found that non-anxious individuals exhibit a positive inferential bias that anxious 
subjects lack suggesting that the negative interpretation bias in socially anxious 
individuals may be accompanied by a lack of a physiological benign interpretation bias. 
Later, using a different paradigm this finding could be reproduced by further research 
both in subclinical socially anxious undergraduates (Beard and Amir, 2009) as well as 
in patients with SAD (Amir et al., 2012). 
The three laughter types were all rated to be significantly different from each other 
regarding their social inclusiveness/exclusiveness with taunting laughter being rated as 
the most exclusive and joyful laughter as the most inclusive laughter type. This finding 
is similar to the results of the valence rating in the pre-studies in which taunting laughter 
was rated to be more negative than joyful and tickling laughter while the difference 
between joyful laughter and tickling laughter did not proof to be significant. A possible 
explanation for this difference in the findings of the pre-studies and the main study is 
that in the main study, the stimuli had been selected due to their recognizability and 
authenticity evaluated in the pre-studies. Therefore, the laughter types were assumably 
better recognized in the main study and thus, the difference between joyful laughter and 
tickling laughter reached a significant level. Moreover, it is important to take into 
account that the task that was set to the participants in the main study was different to 
the one in the pre-studies: In the main study, participants were not asked to assess the 
valence but the social inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the presented laughter. Thus, 
independent on whether the stimuli of the main study were better recognizable due to 
their selection, it would be plausible that tickling laughter in spite of its positive valence 
was perceived as less socially inclusive than joyful laughter. 
The finding that the three laughter types were significantly different regarding their 
social inclusiveness/exclusiveness can serve as a plausibility check for the validity of 
the utilized stimulus material. 
The difference in the perception of the three laughter types was a significant one under 
both task conditions (SELF and OTHER). However, under the SELF-condition the 
differences were smaller than under the OTHER-condition, which is demonstrated by 
an interaction effect between task and laughter type: Under the SELF-condition mean 
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laughter ratings of JOY and TIC were rated as less social inclusive than under the 
OTHER-condition whereas for TAU an opposite tendency was observed. This finding 
could be indicative for a cognitive mechanism which makes individuals perceive 
laughter as more mediocre when directly directed at them. The function of this 
mechanism could be a protection against misinterpretations which could lead to social 
consequences. Therefore, interpreting taunting laughter as not that taunting as it may be 
and joyful laughter as not that social inclusive as it may be prevents radical social 
reactions that in a number of cases may be overreactions which would lead to huge 
preventable consequences.  
 
4.2.1.2 Response times 
The response time main effects were observed for the experimental conditions modality, 
laughter type and the interaction between the two of them. Participants were 
significantly slower to respond to unimodally auditorily presented stimuli than to 
audiovisual ones. This can easily be explained by the greater ambiguity unimodally 
presentation has leading to a prolonged process to decide how social inclusive/exclusive 
the presented stimulus is. The significant longer response times for tickling laughter 
than for the other two laughter types can simultaneously be explained by the greater 
ambiguity tickling laughter has since under the experimental circumstances, it is 
presented separated from its natural and obligatory trigger, tickling. Thus, it is prima 
facie hard to recognize. Moreover, this great ambiguity of tickling laughter appears to 
be the reason for the interaction effect between modality and laughter type: Because of 
the difficulty to recognize tickling laughter without its natural trigger, the ambiguity is 
in the audiovisual presentation already that great that in the unimodal auditory 
presentation its ambiguity is not in such a rate increased that response times would 
significantly be prolonged. 
 
4.2.2 Information processing biases 
This chapter is partly adopted from Ritter et al. (2015) where the results of the main 
study as well as their discussion have been published before. Respective passages are 
put in quotation marks and italics. 
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4.2.2.1 Interpretation bias 
The data of the main study demonstrate a negative interpretation bias displayed by the 
tendency of individuals with increasing severity of social anxiety to interpret laughter as 
socially exclusive. So the first hypothesis of the main study could be confirmed. As 
described in the introduction, this finding is in accordance with previous studies 
reporting a negative interpretation bias in SA for verbal (Amir et al., 2005), prosodic 
(Quadflieg et al., 2007) and facial (Heuer et al., 2010; Winton et al., 1995) expressions. 
Now, previous research could be extended since the present study shows that the 
negative interpretation bias can be found also for dynamic audiovisual perception 
conditions which approximate real life communication conditions and for a primordial 
nonverbal signal with high prevalence in human social communication. 
However, a significant interpretation bias for taunting laughter could not be 
demonstrated, which can be explained most likely by a negative ceiling effect for this 
laughter type as already low socially anxious individuals rated taunting laughter as 
socially exclusive. 
The third hypothesis of the main study consisted of the postulation that this negative 
interpretation bias would be stronger for unimodal auditory laughter stimuli than for 
audiovisual stimulation, which the results again confirmed. As described in Ritter et al. 
(2015, p. 182f), “this is in line with the assumption that a negative interpretation bias in 
SA can be observed mostly for ambiguous social cues (e.g., Amir et al., 2005; Heuer et 
al., 2010). The ambiguity in the auditory laughter stimuli can be assumed to be greater 
than in the audiovisual stimuli based on the lack of audiovisual sensory redundancy in 
purely auditory stimuli. This interpretation is corroborated by generally slower 
responses to auditory stimuli which is again in accordance with the pertinent literature 
on audiovisual integration of nonverbal social signals (Collignon et al., 2008; de 
Gelder and Vroomen, 2000; Kreifelts et al., 2007; Massaro and Egan, 1996).”  
Further, there were no significant response time differences between auditory and 
audiovisual laughter presentation: This finding “argues against an audiovisual 
integration deficit for nonverbal social cues in SA as source of the observed effect. 
Nevertheless, despite a plethora of studies exploring behavioral and cerebral correlates 
of audiovisual integration in healthy populations, there is still little data about the 
alteration of audiovisual emotional integration processes in patients with psychiatric 
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conditions (Kreifelts et al., 2013). Therefore, the modality-dependent interpretation bias 
in SA observed in the present study underlines the necessity for further research in this 
area to clarify multimodal sensory integration processes of social cues in SA but also 
other psychiatric disorders. Furthermore, this research is needed to disambiguate 
sensory integration processes from other aspects of the processing of multimodal social 
cues.” (Ritter et al., 2015, p. 183) 
 
4.2.2.2 Attention bias 
The fourth hypothesis of the main study postulated an attention bias towards threatening 
cues which would be displayed by a linear relationship between SA and faster response 
times to taunting laughter than to joyful laughter. This hypothesis could not be 
confirmed by the main study. However, instead, increasing response time differences 
between joyful laughter and each of the other two laughter types could be found which 
were based on a prolongation of mean response times for joyful laughter with increasing 
severity of SA while the response times for the other two laughter types increased only 
marginally. This can be seen as evidence not for an attention bias towards threatening 
cues but for an attention bias away from joyful laughter with increasing severity of SA. 
The meaning of this finding can be described as discussed in Ritter et al. (2015, p. 183): 
“While it could be shown in several studies that socially anxious individuals are hyper-
vigilant towards threatening social cues (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999; Mogg and 
Bradley, 2002), our data also emphasize a tendency to allocate attention away from 
positive/inclusive social stimuli as source of the attention bias in individuals with SA. 
These data support two recent studies. In the first study, it was shown that an attention 
bias away from positive social cues mediated the effect of SA on the response to a social 
stressor (Taylor et al., 2010). The second study demonstrated that an attention training 
towards positive cues leads to a diminished anxiety reactivity to a stressor (Taylor et 
al., 2011). Together, these data suggest a causal function of the attention bias away 
from positive cues in the maintenance of SA. It appears that joyful laughter represents a 
positive stimulus intended to convey positive and inclusive social information (e.g., 
group bonding; Provine, 2013). However, also tickling laughter can be seen as a 
positive social cue as it serves the reinforcement of play behavior. Nevertheless, 
socially anxious individuals did not allocate their attention away from tickling laughter. 
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The reason for this may be that the positive communicative function of tickling laughter 
is context-dependent (i.e., play behavior, body contact). This interpretation is supported 
by the fact that, unlike joyful laughter, tickling laughter was not perceived as clearly 
socially inclusive (i.e., positive in the context of the experiment). It remains an open 
question for future research, however, how tickling laughter may influence attention in 
SA in different experimental contexts (e.g., under implicit, task-irrelevant processing 
conditions). Moreover, it should be noted as a caveat for further research that a 
potential biased distribution of left-handed participants in the study may have obscured 
an association of overall response times and SA.”  
 
4.2.2.3 Interrelations of information and attention biases 
As described in the introduction, theoretical considerations (Hirsch et al., 2006; 
Mathews et al., 1997) as well as empirical data (Amir et al., 2010) support interrelations 
and shared mechanisms of interpretation and attention biases in SA. Since the present 
stimulus material and experimental design were able to elicit both bias types at the same 
time and in an interrelated manner, they appear as useful means for further research in 
this area (Ritter et al., 2015). 
 
4.2.2.4 Specificity of the revealed biases for social anxiety 
The effects of SA on laughter ratings as well as on response times all remained 
significant after controlling for measures of general anxiety and depressive symptoms. 
This indicates that both the interpretation bias (including its increase under unimodal 
stimulus presentation) and the attention bias found in the present study are indeed 
specific for SA. However, the cognitive biases found in the present study were not 
specific to SA after controlling for gelotophobia. The conclusions that can be drawn 
from the present study about the relationship between SA and gelotophobia can be 
described as discussed in Ritter et al. (2015, p. 183): “When including gelotophobia as 
control variable, the relationship between SA and the above biases was fully explained. 
Thus, concomitant gelotophobia in SA can be interpreted as a relevant component in SA 
mediating the effects of SA on laughter perception. Judging from the very high degree 
of shared variance between SA and gelotophobic symptoms, our data indicate that in 
most cases gelotophobia is an inherent feature of SA. However, since the present study 
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was designed to assess gelotophobic symptoms in individuals with different degrees of 
SA, this does not necessarily mean that the majority of gelotophobic individuals also 
suffer from a high degree of SA as was already clarified by Sarid et al. (2011).”  
 
4.2.3 Emotion regulation 
The second hypothesis of the main study postulating that the negative interpretation bias 
would decrease under cognitive reappraisal conditions could not be confirmed. In 
contrast, the attention bias away from joyful laughter when compared to tickling 
laughter was significantly enhanced by cognitive reappraisal in contrast to the attention 
bias when comparing response times to joyful and taunting laughter. This effect, 
however, was fully explained not only by gelotophobic symptoms but also by measures 
of general state and trait anxiety as well as of depressive symptoms so that it cannot be 
claimed specific for SA. 
This negative finding may be due to a methodological issue as described in Ritter et al. 
(2015, p. 183):  “On the one hand, the explicit evaluation of social inclusiveness 
expressed in laughter allows the parallel assessment of interpretation and attention 
biases. On the other hand, however, such a task may render the design less sensitive to 
emotion regulation effects when compared with studies which used cognitive 
reappraisal strategies to modulate emotional experience rather than the evaluation of 
social cues (Goldin et al., 2009a; Goldin et al., 2009b). A means to overcome this 
potential weakness of the design - while preserving its strengths - in future studies could 
be to increase power by increasing the SA gradient through a comparison between low 
socially anxious individuals with cases of severe social anxiety disorder while 
abstaining from any hypotheses on linear effects.” Since laughter as a communication 
signal has not only the capability to express the emotional state of the laughing person, 
but also to evoke emotions in the laugher-perceiving individual, another potential 
experimental design for future research regarding this issue could comprise the task to 
assess not only the emotion / intention that is expressed by the laughing person, but to 
investigate the emotions that are induced in the receiver of the laughter as well. Such an 
investigation of the induced emotions could consist of a self-assessment of the laughter-
perceiving individuals as well as of measurements of physiological parameters such as 
heart rate or skin conductance. 
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5. Summary 
5.1 Summary in English language 
Social anxiety (SA) is the fear of embarrassment and humiliation in social situations 
caused by the expectation of negative evaluation from others. In some individuals, this 
fear reaches a pathological level called social anxiety disorder (SAD). A core 
mechanism in the maintenance of this disorder is thought to be a distorted perception in 
socially anxious individuals which is due to cognitive biases: Socially anxious persons 
tend to interpret neutral or ambiguous stimuli as threatening (i.e., interpretation bias) as 
well as they are hyper-vigilant towards threatening stimuli (i.e., attention bias). 
Moreover, previous research suggests that socially anxious individuals have deficits in 
emotion regulation. The goal of the present study was to use laughter as a new 
ecologically valid stimulus material to investigate cognitive biases and their modulation 
through emotion regulation and cue ambiguity in individuals with varying degrees of 
social anxiety. To this end, laughter sequences were produced and evaluated in four pre-
studies with regard to their recognizability, valence, arousal, dominance and 
authenticity, in order to select appropriate laughter stimuli for the study. The pre-studies 
showed that the utilized stimuli were recognizable with regard to their expressing 
laughter type and that there was an integration effect in the sense that recognition rates 
were higher in audiovisual than in unimodal (auditory or visual) presentation. 
After that, the selected laughter cues were presented to individuals with varying degrees 
of social anxiety and their assessment of the presented laughter sequences was recorded: 
A combination of a negative laughter interpretation bias and an attention bias away 
from joyful/social inclusive laughter in SA was observed. Both biases were not 
attributable to effects of general anxiety and were closely correlated with the concept of 
gelotophobia, the fear of being laughed at. Thus, the study demonstrates altered laughter 
perception in SA. Furthermore, it highlights the usefulness of laughter as a highly 
prevalent social signal for future research on the interrelations of interpretation and 
attention biases in SA and their modulation through emotion regulation. 
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5.2 Deutsche Zusammenfassung (Summary in German language) 
Sozial ängstliche Menschen haben die Angst, sich in sozialen Situationen zu blamieren 
oder beschämt zu werden. Grund hierfür ist die bei ihnen vorhandene Erwartung, dass 
sie, ihr Erscheinungsbild oder ihr Verhalten von anderen in negativer Weise bewertet 
wird. Während soziale Ängste in der Bevölkerung generell weit verbreitet sind, 
erreichen diese Ängste bei manchen Individuen ein pathologisches Maß, welches zu 
sozialem Rückzug führt und die Betroffenen in ihrer Lebensweise in erheblichem Maße 
einschränken kann. Diese Form der sozialen Ängstlichkeit wird als Soziale Phobie 
bezeichnet und stellt eine anerkannte psychiatrische Krankheitsentität dar. Es wird 
davon ausgegangen, dass eine bei Sozialphobikern bestehende verzerrte Wahrnehmung 
die Hauptursache für die oft über mehrere Jahre bis Jahrzehnte überdauernde 
Chronifizierung einer Sozialen Phobie darstellt. Als Ursache hierfür konnten durch eine 
Vielzahl von Forschungsarbeiten folgende kognitive Veränderungen ausgemacht 
werden: Sozial ängstliche Personen neigen dazu, neutrale oder mehrdeutige Reize als 
bedrohlich zu interpretieren (negative Interpretationsverzerrung) und haben eine 
gesteigerte Aufmerksamkeit gegenüber bedrohlichen Stimuli 
(Aufmerksamkeitsverzerrung). Außerdem scheinen sozial ängstliche Menschen in ihren 
Möglichkeiten der Emotionsregulation eingeschränkt zu sein.  
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Studie war es, mithilfe von Lachen als Stimulusmaterial 
kognitive Verzerrungen und ihre Modulation durch das Anwenden von 
Emotionsregulationsmechanismen und Veränderungen der Stimuluseindeutigkeit bei 
Personen mit unterschiedlicher Ausprägung von sozialer Angst zu untersuchen. Dafür 
wurden passende Lachsequenzen hergestellt und in vier Vorstudien im Hinblick auf die 
Erkennbarkeit des in ihnen ausgedrückten Lachtyps, auf ihre Authentizität sowie der 
durch sie ausgedrückten Valenz, des Arousals und der Dominanz evaluiert. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigten, dass die verwendeten Stimuli im Hinblick auf die von ihnen 
ausgedrückten Lachtypen erkennbar waren. Außerdem konnte ein audiovisueller 
Integrationseffekt festgestellt werden: Audiovisuell gezeigte Stimuli wurden besser 
erkannt als unimodal (auditiv oder visuell) präsentierte. 
In der darauf folgenden Hauptstudie wurden die aufgrund der Ergebnisse der 
Vorstudien ausgewählten Lachsequenzen Probanden mit unterschiedlicher Ausprägung 
von sozialer Ängstlichkeit gezeigt. Dabei konnten eine negative 
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Interpretationsverzerrung sowie eine Aufmerksamkeitsverzerrung weg von freudigem 
Lachen festgestellt werden. Beide Veränderungen waren spezifisch für soziale 
Ängstlichkeit und korrelierten eng mit dem Konzept der Gelotophobie, der Angst vor 
dem Ausgelacht-werden. Die vorliegende Studie demonstriert daher eine veränderte 
Wahrnehmung von Lachen bei sozial ängstlichen Menschen. Ferner unterstreicht sie die 
Nützlichkeit von Lachen als ein häufig vorkommendes soziales Signal für zukünftige 
Forschung auf dem Gebiet der kognitiven Veränderungen bei Menschen mit sozialer 
Ängstlichkeit und deren Modulation durch Emotionsregulationsmechanismen.
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